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Abstract
Problem definition: Transshipment/inventory sharing has been used in practice be-
cause of its risk-pooling potential. However, human decision makers play a criti-
cal role in making inventory decisions in an inventory sharing system, which may 
affect its benefits. We investigate whether the opportunity to transship inventory 
influences decision makers’ inventory decisions and whether, as a result, the in-
tended risk-pooling benefits materialize. 
Academic/practical relevance: Previous research in transshipment, which is focused 
on finding optimal stocking and sharing decisions, assumes rational decision mak-
ing without any systematic bias. As one of the first to study inventory sharing from 
a behavioral perspective, we demonstrate a persistent stocking-decision bias rel-
evant for inventory sharing systems. 
Methodology: We develop a behavioral model of a multilocation inventory system 
with transshipments. Using four behavioral studies, we identify, test, estimate, and 
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mitigate a demand-side underweighting bias: although inventory sharing brings 
both a supply-side benefit and a demand-side benefit, players underestimate the 
latter. We show analytically that such bias leads to underordering. We also explore 
whether reframing the inventory sharing decision reduces this bias. 
Results: Our results show that subjects persistently reduce their order quantities when 
transshipments are allowed. This underordering, which persists even when a de-
cision-support system suggests optimal quantities, causes insufficient inventory 
in the system, in turn reducing the risk-pooling benefits of inventory sharing. Un-
derordering is evidently caused by an underweighting bias; although players cor-
rectly estimate the supply-side potential from transshipment, they only estimate 
20% of the demand-side potential. 
Managerial implications: Although inventory sharing can profitably reduce inven-
tory, too much underordering undermines its intended risk-pooling benefits. The 
demand-side benefits of transshipment need to be emphasized when implement-
ing inventory sharing systems. 
Keywords: inventory sharing, behavioral operations, demand-side underweighting 
bias, structural estimation 
1. Introduction 
Inventory sharing, also called transshipment, is used in practice because 
of its potential to increase profitability and service levels through risk 
pooling. Example applications stem from different industries, such as 
automotive and machine tools (Narus and Anderson 1996), spare parts 
(Zhao et al. 2005, 2006), fashion (Dong and Rudi 2004), wholesale/re-
tail (Gallagher 2002), and many online trading platforms (Zhao and Bisi 
2010). The notion of a sharing economy has made sharing inventory or 
capacity more prevalent in everyday life as well. 
The benefits of inventory sharing, for example, improving service lev-
els, reducing system inventory, and improving profitability, ultimately 
depend on inventory stocking and sharing decisions. If these decisions 
are made optimally, the benefits of inventory sharing have been dem-
onstrated through many analytical and simulation studies (e.g., Tagaras 
1989, Evers 2001). There is, however, little academic research that ex-
amines how managers make such decisions. To gain a better understand-
ing of how these decisions are made in practice, we conducted several 
interviews with managers of firms from different industries and further 
administered a survey in cooperation with the Association for Supply 
Chain Management on these topics. Fifty-four firms responded to the 
part of the survey focused on transshipments.1 
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In the survey, we asked how inventory orders are created—whether 
these orders are automated or made through human judgment. Among 
the 54 respondents, none indicated that inventory orders are entirely 
made by software without any involvement of human judgment, three 
indicated that inventory orders are entirely made by human judgment, 
35 indicated that inventory orders are based on software and then ad-
justed by human judgment, and another 10 indicated that orders rep-
resent averages between judgments and an automated order. The re-
sponses to this question highlight that inventory decisions in practice are 
mostly a combination of human judgment and software. This resonates 
with many documented cases where human planners regularly intervene 
to adjust automated inventory orders (e.g., van Donselaar et al. 2010). 
Regarding transshipments, which occur if, for example, “one distri-
bution center runs low on a certain stock and obtains extra inventory 
for replenishment from another distribution center instead of a manu-
facturing site,” we asked respondents how often they transship inven-
tory within different stages in the supply chain in the past 12 months. 
Responses for each stage could vary on a scale from never to extremely 
often. Respondents could also indicate that they do not know or that this 
supply chain stage does not apply to them. In general, inventory sharing 
does not occur frequently among the firms in our sample. For the firms 
indicating that some transshipments happen within their supply chains 
(n = 34), we asked what usually triggers these transshipments. Not a sin-
gle respondent indicated that transshipments occur because of sugges-
tions by inventory software. Eleven respondents indicated that trans-
shipments are triggered by centralized inventory planners, and seven 
respondents indicated that these transshipments are triggered by man-
agers at the site. Eleven firms said that transshipments are triggered by 
an immediate stockout for a critical item that needs to be addressed; 
this is a sign that transshipments are often less proactive but rather re-
active to address “firefighting” needs. We asked firms where transship-
ments never or only rarely happen (n = 16) why this is the case. The most 
frequently chosen answers were a lack of strategy for transshipments 
(43%) and a sense of the cost of transshipping inventory generally out-
weighing the benefits (42%). People also indicated that their software 
does not consider transshipments (36%). 
These data convey that although algorithms (e.g., inventory man-
agement software) are widely used in industry to support inventory 
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decision making, inventory sharing opportunities are rarely considered 
by these algorithms. Consequently, store, distribution center, and man-
ufacturing site managers must figure out the implications of inventory 
sharing on their own. How they make such decisions is a critical aspect 
influencing the profitability of the system. Underreacting to the inven-
tory sharing opportunities would leave benefits of risk pooling on the 
table, whereas overreacting to them could lead to a dearth of inventory 
in the system. This motivates us to study the inventory sharing problem 
from a behavioral perspective. 
Many experiments have documented biases in inventory decisions in 
the context of both single-location (e.g., Schweitzer and Cachon 2000) 
and multilocation newsvendor problems (e.g., Ho et al. 2010). There-
fore, we aim to investigate two research questions: (1) Does the oppor-
tunity to transship inventory between decision makers alter their order-
ing behavior? And (2) if yes, what is the implication of such changes to 
the expected risk-pooling benefits? 
To tackle these research questions, we examine the most studied in-
ventory sharing model, that described by Rudi et al. (2001), from a be-
havioral perspective. Indeed, in addition to the familiar pull-to-center 
bias observed in a multilocation setting without inventory sharing, we 
find some persistent bias in human decision makers’ stocking decisions 
when provided with inventory sharing opportunities. Note that trans-
shipments bring both supply-side benefits (an opportunity to obtain 
extra supplies from the other player) and demand-side benefits (an op-
portunity to sell extra products to the other player). Although in theo-
retical models these two benefits are equally considered in the calcu-
lation of the optimal ordering quantities, we find that decision makers 
in our experiments consistently underweight the demand-side bene-
fits. Such a bias leads to the systematic underordering of inventory be-
cause decision makers fail to perceive the extra revenue they may gen-
erate by selling to the other player. As a result, inventory sharing may 
be less beneficial in practice than in theory if there is too much under-
ordering in the system. We further explore the potential root causes as 
well as potential intervention strategies to counter such a demand-side 
underweighting bias. 
Our paper makes several important contributions to the field of in-
ventory sharing as well as behavioral operations management. As one of 
the first papers to study the behavioral aspects of inventory sharing, we 
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identified, modeled, and tested a systematic demand-side underweight-
ing bias leading to consistent underordering behavior. Specifically, first, 
we developed a new behavioral model of a multilocation inventory sys-
tem with transshipments. This model assumes that in addition to the 
well-known psychological costs for underage and overage that are preva-
lent in the newsvendor setting, a decision maker also differs in his or her 
perceptions of the supply-side and demand-side benefits of inventory 
sharing. We show analytically that with demand-side underweighting, a 
decision maker will, in turn, underorder. Second, we designed and con-
ducted experiments in the laboratory to examine order quantities, prof-
its, and service-level outcomes in this context. Our experiments demon-
strate that inventory sharing opportunities indeed alter our participants’ 
ordering behavior—they persistently underorder when given the oppor-
tunity to transship inventory. This is true after the pull-to-center effect is 
taken into consideration. Such underordering persists even when deci-
sion makers are provided with a decision-support system that suggests 
inventory order quantities but permits their revision (a typical practice 
in industry). This underordering behavior causes a shortage of inven-
tory in the system, which, in turn, reduces the potential for the players 
to benefit from risk pooling through inventory sharing. Third, using data 
from our experiments, we estimated the parameters in the proposed 
behavioral model through structural estimation and showed that the 
model captures inventory decisions in our context better than a model 
that incorporates only the psychological cost of underage and overage. 
The parameter estimates indicate that although the subjects’ evaluations 
of the availability of extra supply through transshipments are close to 
the correct level, their evaluations of the demand-side potential are far 
off, representing only 20% of the true demand-side potential through 
transshipments. Fourth, we identified several potential root causes for 
such demand-side underweighting, including the desire for control, see-
ing reluctance in requesting in others but not in themselves, and valuing 
own markets more than others’ markets. Finally, we explored several in-
tervention strategies, such as reframing inventory sharing, automated 
transshipments, and advanced decision-support tools, to mitigate this 
demand-side underweighting bias. 
From a practical point of view, our paper provides important guid-
ance to decision makers of inventory sharing systems. Although inven-
tory sharing has the potential to reduce inventory in the system because 
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of risk pooling, too much underordering can undermine the intended 
benefits. In addition, managers should not underestimate the demand-
side benefits from inventory sharing because the demand-side serves 
as a secondary market for them and brings additional profit. Introduc-
ing inventory sharing systems should go together with emphasizing the 
extra revenue-generating potential of such a practice. 
It is worthwhile to mention that our research is also relevant in the 
context of omnichannel retailing. Over the past decade, most traditional 
offline retailers have built an online presence. How much to stock for 
each channel and how to best fulfill orders originating from either chan-
nel remain among the top challenges for omnichannel retailers. Tradi-
tionally, many retailers held separate stocks for online and offline stores. 
However, because of the benefits of risk pooling, many of them are pool-
ing such inventory, for example, using in-store inventory for online order 
fulfillment and vice versa (Alishah et al. 2017). Such an arrangement can 
lead to in-store inventory being reserved for either online or offline cus-
tomers, and decisions to share inventory between these two reserved 
piles are often negotiated between the managers of online channels and 
stores. Indeed, one of the biggest fashion retailers in the nation that we 
interviewed regularly transships inventory between online and offline 
stockpiles and faces the challenge of making appropriate stocking deci-
sions for these two channels. Our research suggests that channel man-
agers may underestimate the value of using this system to sell in the 
other channel and instead primarily view this system as a way of “dip-
ping” into the inventory reserved for the other channel. 
We proceed with our paper as follows. In Section 2, we review the re-
lated literature. In Section 3, we briefly explain the rational theory un-
derlying our context, serving as a benchmark. In Section 4, we present 
a corresponding behavioral model in which we consider the proposed 
demand-side underweighting bias; we also present experimental evi-
dence for demand-side underweighting and its impact on the profits and 
service levels of the system and estimate the underweighting bias from 
our behavioral model. In Section 5, we explore the root causes for de-
mand-side underweighting and propose interventions to mitigate this 
bias. In Section 6, we discuss insights from our findings and conclude 
our research. 
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2. Literature Review 
The inventory sharing/transshipment problem has been studied exten-
sively because the prospect of transshipments has the potential to both 
improve service levels and reduce system inventory. However, most of 
this research is focused on analytical modeling, characterizing optimal 
stocking, and sharing decisions. Early research assumed a centralized 
power that could decide how stockpiles were made available to different 
players. Although such a central authority may exist, supply chains are 
often more decentralized. There are ample examples of inventory shar-
ing among independent players (e.g., Zhao et al. 2005). Correspondingly, 
a large amount of analytical modeling research has examined these de-
centralized players’ optimal/equilibrium stocking and sharing decisions 
and how appropriate incentives can induce players to choose the opti-
mal solution. Rudi et al. (2001), referred to as RKP hereafter, studied a 
single-period model and are among the first to study inventory sharing 
in such a decentralized system. After developing the equilibrium order 
quantities, the authors explore coordination of such a system through a 
linear transfer price. Many other papers have also studied decentralized 
inventory sharing systems in various settings, for example, Anupindi et 
al. (2001), Zhao et al. (2005), Rong et al. (2010), Shao et al. (2011), Yan 
and Zhao (2011). 
Although this literature focuses on the optimal/equilibrium behavior 
to extract the risk-pooling benefit of inventory sharing, it also assumes 
perfectly rational decision makers who do not exhibit systematic bi-
ases. Behavioral experiments have generally challenged the assumption 
of perfect rationality in stocking decisions, both in single-location (e.g., 
Schweitzer and Cachon 2000) and in multilocation newsvendor prob-
lems (e.g., Ho et al. 2010). Our research investigates the potential bias 
in order quantity decisions in an inventory sharing system and its im-
pact on the performance of such a system. 
Although our research is among the first to examine the behavioral 
aspects of inventory sharing, some other works in progress are also ex-
amining inventory sharing systems. For example, Bostian et al. (2012) 
examine inventory orders when the system automatically makes trans-
shipment decisions for the players and study whether decision makers 
in the experiment benefit from inventory sharing by estimating struc-
tural models to establish counterfactuals. In contrast, we examine this 
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question more explicitly through randomized treatments in which we 
allow subjects to make their own decisions on requesting inventory and 
accepting/rejecting such requests for transshipment. Two other works 
are concerned with setting the transfer price of transshipments: Villa 
and Katok (2018) focus on negotiation of the transfer price, and Chen 
and Li (2020) focus on the sequence in setting the transfer price and 
making stocking decisions. In our research, we treat the transfer price 
as exogenous in order to separate the two decisions (stocking and trans-
fer prices) and examine how decision makers react to the transfer price 
in their ordering decisions. 
3. Rational Theory 
In this section, we briefly discuss the equilibrium solutions for rational 
players in the inventory sharing system, which serve as the normative 
benchmarks for our behavioral model and experiments, as well as pro-
vide basic insights into the system. 
3.1. The Inventory Sharing Model 
We adopt the basic framework from RKP, the single-period, two-location, 
decentralized inventory sharing system where transshipments lead to 
payments between parties through a transfer price. We chose this frame-
work because (1) it is the simplest and most studied decentralized in-
ventory sharing setting and (2) the transshipment decisions in this set-
ting are simple, allowing us to examine decision makers’ motivations 
without having to consider their bounded rationality. 
Consider two independent players, one at each distinct location. Each 
player faces independent random demand Di (i = 1, 2) in a single period 
and must place an order Qi at price ci at the beginning of the period be-
fore observing demand. After demand is realized, each player uses his 
or her own inventory to satisfy demand. For each unit of demand satis-
fied, a player receives revenue ri. Any unsold inventory may be salvaged 
at the salvage value si < ci. The decision maker also incurs a penalty cost 
of pi for each unit of unmet demand. As in RKP, we define vi = ri + pi as 
the marginal value of additional sales at location i. Let Fi represent the 
cumulative distribution function of Di. Without inventory sharing, this 
framework corresponds to two independent newsvendors with their 
optimal order quantities calculated as 
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Q*i,n = Fi−1
  ( vi − ci )                                                                         vi − si 
In the inventory sharing model, after observing demand, inventory 
can be shared if one player has extra units available and the other has 
a shortage. Specifically, player j may request transshipment of a certain 
amount from player i, who may then decide how much, if any, to share 
with player j. For each unit of inventory shared from i to j, player i re-
ceives a unit transfer price of cij from j but pays a transportation cost 
τij. To avoid trivial cases, we set cij ≥ sj + τij as in RKP to ensure that the 
source is willing to send (i.e., sending a unit is more profitable than sal-
vaging the unit) and set cij ≤ vj to ensure that the recipient wants the 
transshipments (i.e., requesting a unit of transshipments is more prof-
itable than losing the sale). To simplify the decisions in the experiments, 
we assume negligible transportation costs (τij = 0) throughout the paper. 
Any inventory sharing problem involves two essential decisions—
how much to stock initially and how much to share or request. In this 
model, because inventory sharing occurs at the end of the period after 
demand is realized, a player (say i) should always request the inventory 
that is needed to fill demand, that is, (Di − Qi)+, and share what is left af-
ter filling demand, that is, (Qi − Di)+. Here we define x+ = max(0, x). There-
fore, the total number of units shared from i to j is 
Tij = min [( Dj − Qj )+, ( Qi − Di )+ ] 
Given Tij, it can be shown that a unique set of equilibrium order quan-
tities exists for the two players, (Q*i,s, Q*j,s ), which can be calculated by 
solving equation (10) in RPK. 
3.2. Normative Benchmarks for Our Experiments 
In Subsection 3.1, we provide general game-theoretic results. Next, we 
demonstrate and discuss the specific equilibrium solutions that result 
from the numerical parameters that we will later use in our experiments. 
These solutions will provide the intuition our behavioral experiments. 
To be consistent with the literature, we adopted most applicable pa-
rameters from RKP. Specifically, we used a symmetric system in which 
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both players face the same parameters. Hence, we will thereafter drop 
the subscripts i and j for the players. The cost parameters are r = 40, c = 
20, s = 10, and p = 0. As mentioned earlier, we kept τ = 0 to simplify the 
decisions in the experiments. For our numerical studies, we selected 
nine levels of the transfer price in the feasible transfer price interval cij 
∈ [s, v]. For demand, we adopted normal demand as in RKP with Di ~ 
N(200, 70.71).2 As in RKP, we also used a truncated normal distribution 
when generating demand realizations to avoid negative demand. Using 
the theoretical results, we calculated the equilibrium order quantities 
Q*s. Figure 1 presents the equilibrium order quantities and expected 
profit as cij increases and compares these with the case in which shar-
ing is prohibited (Q*n = 230). 
The equilibrium order quantity Q*s increases as the transfer price in-
creases, with Q*s < Q*n at the lowest transfer price (cij = 10) and Q*s > Q*n 
at the highest transfer price (cij = 40). This result follows directly from 
the theoretical results in RKP. The basic intuition of this result is that 
depending on the transfer price, transshipments can be viewed as an 
additional source of either uncertain supply or uncertain demand. Spe-
cifically, at the lowest transfer price cij = s = 10, transshipments are a 
good source of supply but not a good source of demand (a player earns 
no more than the salvage value from transshipped inventory). There-
fore, to maximize profit, players should order less (than the no-sharing 
model) to capitalize on this potential supply source. By contrast, when 
cij = v = 40, transshipments are a good source of demand but not of sup-
ply (a player buys a transshipped unit at the selling price, earning zero 
profit). Hence, players should order more (than the no-sharing model) 
Figure 1. Theoretical Optimal Orders and Expected Profit Under Different Transfer 
Prices  
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to take advantage of this possible extra demand source. As the transfer 
price increases, the tendency to take advantage of possible extra demand 
from the other player increases. At the same time, the tendency to take 
advantage of the possible supply from the other player decreases. Both 
these tendencies cause players to order more initial inventory as the 
transfer price increases. Therefore, for rational players, a right transfer 
price can achieve a desirable stocking level and thus coordinate the sys-
tem. As Figure 1(b) shows, in our setting, the transfer price of 23 coor-
dinates the system and maximizes the expected profit.  
4. Demand-Side Underweighting in Inventory Sharing 
Having defined the rational equilibrium order quantities in Section 3, in 
this section, we will discuss behavioral reasons that may lead to devia-
tions from the rational benchmark, that is, demand-side underweight-
ing (Section 4.1). We then demonstrate such deviations through a series 
of controlled experiments and examine their implication for the effec-
tiveness of the inventory sharing system (Section 4.2). We further esti-
mate the parameters of our behavioral model and quantify such behav-
ioral bias through another set of experiments (Section 4.3). 
4.1. Behavioral Theory 
In this section, we propose a behavioral theory that explains why sub-
jects’ order decisions may deviate from the rational benchmark dis-
cussed in Section 3. Specifically, we propose that players suffer from a 
demand-side underweighting bias: although they intuitively understand 
that the opportunity to request transshipments from the other player 
provides them with an extra source of supply (supply-side benefits), they 
underestimate the potential for additional sales through transshipment 
requests from the other player (demand-side benefits). As the preceding 
section emphasizes, rational equilibrium strategies are based on both 
supply-side and demand-side benefits, with order quantities being be-
low the newsvendor quantity for low transfer prices (when supply-side 
benefits are more salient) and above the news vendor quantity for high 
transfer prices (when demand-side benefits are more salient). Demand-
side underweighting points to an asymmetry—people focus more on 
the supply-side benefits than on the demand-side benefits of inventory 
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sharing. To investigate how this asymmetry affects players’ initial or-
ders, we developed the following behavioral transshipment model. Re-
call that a rational player j expects the transshipment from player i as 
Tij  = min [( Dj − Qj )+, ( Qi − Di )+ ]                                     (1) 
Equation (1) implies that player j is aware that the transshipments he or 
she can obtain from the other player are subject to how much the other 
player can supply, and player j has an unbiased expectation of the extra 
supply from the other player. But a biased player may not correctly es-
timate the supply available from the other player—player j may expect 
the transshipments he or she can obtain from player i as 
Tij = min [( Dj − Qj )+, α ( Qi − Di )+ ]                                      (2) 
where α = 1 indicates that player j has an unbiased estimation of the ex-
tra supply available to him or her from the other player, whereas α >(<)1 
indicates that player j will overestimate (underestimate) the inventory 
supply from the other player. Likewise, a biased player j may evaluate 
the amount he or she can sell to player i as 
Tji = min [( Qj − Dj )+, β ( Di − Qi )+]                                       (3) 
where β = 1 indicates that player j is unbiased in estimating the amount 
he or she could sell to the other player, whereas β < (>)1 indicates that 
player j underestimates (overestimates) the opportunity of selling to the 
other player. When β _ 0, player j is totally ignorant of the demand-side 
opportunity to sell to the other player. 
Both players decide their initial orders subject to the biased valuation 
of the supply/demand-side opportunities characterized by (2) and (3) 
rather than (1), thus leading to suboptimal ordering. Specifically, Prop-
osition 1 shows the condition under which players exhibit underorder-
ing behavior. Recall that Q*s denotes the equilibrium order quantity un-
der inventory sharing for rational players; that is, α = 1 and β = 1. Let 
Qs(α, β) be the equilibrium order quantity for biased players. Proposi-
tion 1 characterizes the relationship between Qs(α, β) and Q*s . 
Proposition 1. Qs(α, β) decreases in α and increases in β. When (α = 1 
and β < 1) or (α > 1 and β = 1), players exhibit underordering behavior, 
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that is, Qs(α, β) <Q*s. 
The proof is in the supplement. Proposition 1 suggests that biased 
players may lower their initial orders when given the inventory shar-
ing opportunity because of the asymmetry between the perceived sup-
ply-side and demand-side benefits either because of (1) overestimating 
sharing as an extra supply source (i.e., overweighting the supply-side 
benefit) or because of (2) underestimating sharing as an extra selling op-
portunity (i.e., underweighting demand-side benefits). In the following 
sections, we will design and report a series of experiments to explore a 
player’s demand-side underweighting bias in inventory sharing and es-
timate the value of α and β using data from our experiments. 
4.2. Evidence for Demand-Side Underweighting 
We designed our first study to examine ordering and transshipment de-
cisions under inventory sharing for products with different profit mar-
gins. We know from existing behavioral newsvendor research that deci-
sion makers—even without the opportunity to share inventory—place 
orders with less-than-optimal quantities in high-margin conditions and 
order more than the optimal quantities in low-margin conditions (the so-
called pull-to-center effect; see, e.g., Zhang and Siemsen 2019). Because 
of the potential asymmetry between the perceived supply-side and de-
mand-side benefits, we believe that participants may in addition experi-
ence a demand-side underweighting bias when given the opportunity to 
share inventory. With a low transfer price, the supply-side benefits of in-
ventory sharing are very salient for decision makers. We thus expect that 
the opportunity to share inventory will lead to a reduction in initial orders. 
Hypothesis 1a. Under inventory sharing with a low transfer price, sub-
jects will lower their orders compared with the case without inventory 
sharing. 
By contrast, with a high transfer price, the supply side of inventory 
sharing (i.e., getting supplementary inventory from the other player) is 
not very profitable, whereas the demand side (i.e., selling to the other 
player through transshipments) is highly profitable. Hence, rational play-
ers should increase their order quantity. However, because demand-side 
underweighting means that this profitable aspect of inventory sharing 
is not very salient for decision makers, we expect that inventory sharing 
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with a high transfer price has little impact on initial order quantities. In 
other words, we expect initial orders to be like those in a situation with-
out inventory sharing. 
Hypothesis 1b. Under inventory sharing with a high transfer price, sub-
jects will not increase their orders compared with the case without in-
ventory sharing. 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b require us to vary inventory sharing and the 
transfer price as treatments. The hypotheses are independent of the 
profit margin of the underlying newsvendor problem. Hence, we ex-
pect these hypotheses to hold across both high- and low-margin condi-
tions. However, we include profit margin as an experimental factor for 
robustness. 
4.2.1. Experimental Design. Our experimental task builds on a clas-
sic newsvendor design. We instructed participants to manage a product 
in a retail setting. In each period, they place their initial inventory or-
ders before knowing their demand realization. As discussed in Section 
3, revenues and costs followed a standard price/cost framing in which 
the sales price for the high-margin condition was set at $40, the pur-
chase cost at $20, and the salvage value at the end of the period at $10. 
We manipulated the experimental design through transfer prices at lev-
els of $15 and $35, which are below and above the coordinating transfer 
price (i.e., $23), respectively. We used these two transfer prices to test 
whether a higher transfer price induces a higher order quantity than a 
lower transfer price does (in accordance with Figure 1(a)), which is the 
premise for coordinating the system through the transfer price. We ex-
plicitly informed participants that the actual cost of a lost sale was $0 
to avoid ambiguity about the implications of stockouts. The critical frac-
tile was 66% for the no-sharing newsvendor model. In the correspond-
ing low-margin condition, the sales price was also set at $40, but we in-
creased the purchase cost to $30, leading to a critical fractile of 33%. 
Demand in each period was normally distributed with a mean of 200 
and a standard deviation of 70.71 and was truncated at zero. Without 
inventory sharing, the optimal order quantity is 230 units in the high-
margin condition and 170 units in the low-margin condition. 
Before starting the experiment, we provided participants with 
Z h a o ,  Xu ,  &  S i e m s e n  i n  M a n u fac t u r i n g  &  S v c  O p s  M g m t  ( 2 0 2 0 )        15
instructions about the normal distribution, and we depicted the density 
function of the demand distribution on their screens. Random draws 
of demand were different for each participant. As the experiment pro-
ceeded, these demand draws were plotted in a time-series graph as 
well as shown in a table. Demand draws across periods were indepen-
dent, and participants were informed about that. Participants repeated 
the task for 30 time periods. They were compensated on completion 
based on their profits obtained across all periods. Their total compen-
sation was based on $6 for showing up in addition to 0.0095% of their 
total profits earned across all experimental conditions. Average pay-
ment per participant was $15.51. The experiment was implemented in 
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and conducted with a standardized subject 
pool at a large American public university. Participants were mostly un-
dergraduate students at the university. Sessions were scheduled to last 
for 45 minutes. Participants were randomly assigned to different treat-
ments (e.g., sharing or no sharing) in each session and were required to 
watch a five-minute video explaining their corresponding experimen-
tal task. They also had access to written instructions at any time dur-
ing the experiment. We used a between-subjects design, varying three 
factors: (1) inventory sharing, (2) profit margin, and (3) transfer price. 
Because the transfer price has no meaning under no inventory sharing, 
this design resulted in six experimental conditions, summarized in Ta-
ble 1. Summary statistics, including average order quantities and prof-
its, for all experimental conditions in our paper are provided in Table 
A1 in the supplement.  
Participants were grouped into channels of four or six players. Chan-
nels were unrestricted in size in no-sharing conditions. Each channel 
Table 1. Overview of Experiments with/without Inventory Sharing
Condition  Sharing  Critical  Optimal  Transfer  Participants  Order  
  fractile  order  price   quantity
C1  No  66%  230  —  26  209.74
C2  No  33%  170  —  24  194.07
C3  Yes  66%  212  $15  26  197.79
C4  Yes  66%  237  $35  24  206.89
C5  Yes  33%  162  $15  26  185.80
C6  Yes  33%  186  $35  26  187.50
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was fixed on one experimental condition. Subjects did not know that 
they were associated with a channel. We informed them that they would 
be matched to a random player after each period. This random match-
ing was specific to channels. Under inventory sharing, subjects could 
request supplementary inventory transshipments from their matched 
player after observing their own demand. Participants could not see the 
other player’s inventory orders or demand. The other player could then 
decide to send transshipments to the requester up to (but not exceed-
ing) the number of units requested. In principle, both players could re-
quest and send transshipments to each other in the same period. There 
were no transshipment costs besides the transfer payment. 
4.2.2. Analysis. We first examine order quantities as our dependent 
variable. The model we use to analyze our experimental data has the 
following structure: 
Orderi = a1 + a2C2i + a3C3i + a4C4i + a5C5i 
+ a6C6i + b1D1i + b2D2i + εi                               (4) 
Here Orderi denotes the average order quantity of participant i across 
all 30 periods. We code the experimental conditions with dummy vari-
ables (e.g., C3 takes the value of one only if the observation is made in 
condition 3) and include them in our analysis, as Equation (4) demon-
strated. The base case is the high-margin, no-sharing case (i.e., C1). Our 
only control variable in this analysis is the average demand faced by sub-
jects. Demand is by design uncorrelated with treatments and thus does 
not bias our treatment effect estimates. Despite participants knowing 
that the underlying demand distribution stays the same across periods, 
they react strongly to the observed demand signals, thus introducing 
noise to their observed order decision. Adding this control variable thus 
creates econometric efficiency benefits (i.e., more precise coefficient es-
timates). We expect a nonlinearity in the effect of demand; in particular, 
there should be decreasing effects of observed demand on order quan-
tities because the likelihood of obtaining profit (and thus the chance of 
positive reinforcement) decreases with higher orders. We estimate a 
spline regression on our combined experimental data with an estimated 
knot. Results indicate that this knot is very close to mean demand (b = 
200.65, p = 0.90 for difference with 200); hence we fix the spline knot 
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at 200 throughout. Accordingly, we include D1i = min(Di, 200) and D2i = 
(Di − 200)+ as controls. 
Although our data are recorded as decisions, our unit of analysis is 
an individual; that is, we average decisions across time periods for an 
individual. Variance of our treatments occurs between subjects, which 
means that the treatment effects are only identified by between-subject 
variance. Further, this aggregation allows us to reduce the complexity 
of our model specification because we do not need to consider the de-
tails of adequately lagging control variables but can rely on averages in-
stead. Because multiple individuals were nested in a z-Tree channel, we 
first estimated a random effects model to examine this potential for de-
pendence within our data. This concern about individuals being nested 
in a channel during the experiment was recently highlighted as a meth-
odological consideration in behavioral operations by Hyndman and Em-
brey (2018). However, in our case, the standard deviation of the chan-
nel random effects accounts for only 3% of the total error variance; we 
thus resorted to ordinary least squares regression analysis instead. Re-
gression results are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2 suggests that with a low transfer price, subjects lower their 
orders when inventory sharing is allowed, with a decrease of 10.82 
(= 18.69 − 7.87, p = 0.06) under a low-margin case and a decrease of 
7.11 (p = 0.22) under a high-margin case. This is due to the salience of 
Table 2. Regression Estimates from Experiments with/Without Inventory Sharing
    All 30 periods  Last 15 periods
Condition  Coef.  SE  Coef.  SE
C2: Low margin, no sharing  −7.87  (5.95)  −17.76**  (6.78)
C3: High margin, low transfer price  −7.11  (5.82)  −14.89*  (6.63)
C4: High margin, high transfer price  3.58  (5.91)  −2.05  (6.88)
C5: Low margin, low transfer price  −18.69**  (5.76)  −26.31**  (6.63)
C6: Low margin, high transfer price  −15.20**  (5.81)  −23.89**  (6.66)
Average demand (≤200)  1.07**  (0.30)  0.50*  (0.03)
Average demand (>200)  0.64**  (0.22)  0.28  (0.17)
Constant  −8.51  (58.82)  110.07*  (45.51)
N  152   152
R2  31%   23%
The omitted category is condition 1, that is, the high-margin, no-sharing condition. All coeffi-
cients measure differences in order quantities compared with this condition. Coef., coefficients; 
SE, standard error.
* p ≤ 0.05 ; ** p ≤ 0.01
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supply-side benefits under a low transfer price. With a high transfer 
price, although subjects should increase their orders according to the 
normative theory, they do not do so, with a decrease of 7.33 (= 15.2 − 
7.87, p = 0.21) under the low-margin case and an increase of only 3.58 
(p = 0.55) under the high-margin case. This provides evidence that sub-
jects underweight the demand-side benefits under a high transfer price. 
To formally test Hypothesis 1a, we estimated a joint contrast between 
conditions 1 and 3 (for the high-margin case) as well as conditions 2 and 
5 (for the low-margin case). Results from this contrast weakly support 
Hypothesis 1a by suggesting that the mean order quantities in the con-
text of a low transfer price are less than those under the no-sharing set-
ting (F = 2.49, p ≤ 0.10). Descriptively, 73% of subjects in conditions 3 
and 5 (low transfer price setting across different margins) order less on 
average than the corresponding mean order quantities in conditions 1 
and 2 (no-sharing cases across different margins). A similar contrast be-
tween conditions 1 and 4 as well as conditions 2 and 6 reveals that order 
quantities with a high transfer price do not exceed the order quantities 
without sharing (F = 0.98, p = 0.38). Only 36% of subjects in conditions 
4 and 6 have average order quantities that exceed their corresponding 
average order quantities in conditions 1 and 2. These observations sup-
port Hypothesis 1b and are consistent with the idea that relative to the 
supply side, people underweight the demand-side benefit of inventory 
sharing. To examine whether our results are influenced by participant 
experience, we repeated our analysis using only the last 15 decision pe-
riods. Results from this analysis are also reported in Table 2. The results 
from our hypotheses tests become stronger in this analysis, providing 
support to both Hypothesis 1a (F = 3.33, p = 0.04) and Hypothesis 1b (F 
= 0.45, p = 0.63). Subjects also tend to be less influenced by demand ob-
servations in the last 15 periods. 
We also examined subjects’ transshipment decisions in all sharing 
conditions. Specifically, we calculated the optimal request for each sub-
ject and period (which is defined as OptRequest = [Demand-Order]+) and 
then established the difference between this optimal request and the 
actual request made. Similarly, we calculated the optimal send (which 
is defined as OptSend = min[Request, Leftover]) and contrasted the op-
timal send with the actual amount sent. Note that our subjects should 
have had no difficulties in calculating these optimal requests/sends 
themselves because their shortages and leftovers were displayed on the 
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screen during the experiment (see screen shots in the supplement). Ta-
ble 3 contains an overview of all 3,060 requests made under both high- 
and low-margin sharing treatments. 
We differentiate between situations in which the recipient had a 
shortage and situations in which no shortage existed. It is straightfor-
ward for participants to understand that they have enough inventory 
to meet demand if no shortage exists; indeed, we see that in 94.9% of 
the cases where there was sufficient inventory to meet demand, partic-
ipants requested no additional inventory (subjects are allowed to re-
quest inventory even without shortages). However, when a shortage ex-
isted, it became interesting to examine whether participants requested 
what they needed. We see that recipients’ requests exactly matched their 
shortages only 74.6% of the time. In the other 23.7% (= 8.2% + 15.5%) 
of situations, subjects generally requested less (instead of more) than 
they needed. Because the source is likely to use the recipient’s requests 
as information to estimate expected demand from this secondary mar-
ket, such underrequesting bias means that the source processes cen-
sored information. As a result, the source would generally lower the 
estimate of the potential sales volume in the secondary market, thus 
leading to the underweighting of the demand side of inventory sharing. 
To examine how the source responds to inventory requests, we fo-
cused on the 1,550 (= 249 + 1,200 + 27 + 74; see Table 3) periods in 
which nonzero inventory was requested. Note that if a recipient re-
quested no inventory, the source could not send any inventory, justify-
ing the removal of such situations from the analysis of transshipments 
sent. A key to our analysis here was to interpret transshipment decisions 
both within the context of what was requested and what the source had 
Table 3. Requests Made by Recipients in the Sharing Setting
  Recipient has
  Shortage    No shortage
Request  (order < demand)   (order ≥ demand)
Nothing  132  8.2%  1378  94.9%
Below shortage  249  15.5%  —  —
Exactly shortage  1,200  74.6%  —  —
More than shortage  27  1.7%  74  5.1%
 1,608   1,452
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available. Table 4 examines how sources respond with transshipments 
to recipients’ requests, depending on whether the request exceeds their 
available inventory.  
It was apparent that most sources either fulfilled a request or sent 
what they had available. Strikingly, in 15% (= 7.2% + 7.8%) of situations 
in which inventory requests exceeded a source’s availability (i.e., leftover 
supply), the source nevertheless complied with these requests and trans-
shipped to the recipients more inventory than it had available. In doing 
so, the sources didn’t satisfy all their own demand despite being able to 
sell this inventory at a higher margin in their own market. Note that the 
software we use in our experiment allows this to happen because profit 
is only realized after transshipments are completed. This indicates that 
participants tend to transship more than they should. This tendency 
to oversend inventory is stronger than the tendency to undersend. Be-
cause recipients are likely to use sources’ response to their requests as 
information to estimate the extra supply through transshipments, such 
oversending bias means that the recipients process inflated information 
about the inventory availability at the source. This, in turn, may also lead 
to the underweighting of the demand-side of inventory sharing. 
Our analysis provides additional arguments that support demand-
side underweighting. We found evidence that people persistently un-
der-request inventory from their partners and oversend inventory to 
their partners; this further supports the notion of demand-side under-
weighting in inventory sharing. Decision makers lower their estimate 
of the demand-side benefit of sharing because they observe generally 
low requests. 
Table 4. Transshipments Made Upon Request in the Sharing Setting
                                                                                                              Source Has
                                                                    Sufficient inventory                            Insufficient inventory
Transshipment                                    (request ≤ availability)                         (request > availability)
Below availability  —  —  50  4.2%
At availability  —  —  972  80.9%
Below requested  35  10.1%  86  7.2%
At requested  313  89.9%  94  7.8%
 348   1,202
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4.2.3. Profitability Implications. To examine how inventory sharing in-
fluences the profitability of players, we estimated the effect of our treat-
ments on participants’ profits. The model we use is similar to Equation 
(4), with an additional control variable: the standard deviation of de-
mand. We further add the average order quantities as a covariate to ex-
amine whether subjects who ordered more (or less) in particular con-
ditions were able to obtain higher profits. Results from the analysis are 
summarized in Table A2 in the supplement. Inventory sharing generally 
increases profits. Effect sizes are fairly consistent, with profits in condi-
tion 1 (high margin, no sharing) being lower than profits in condition 3 
(b = 185.40, p ≤ 0.01) and condition 4 (b = 223.91, p ≤ 0.01), that is, high 
margin with low and high transfer prices, respectively. Similarly, profits 
in condition 2 (low margin, no sharing)were lower than profits in condi-
tion 5 (b = 238.93, p ≤ 0.01) and condition 6 (b = 226.83, p ≤ 0.01), that 
is, low margin with low and high transfer prices, respectively. On aver-
age, those with higher order quantities in conditions 1, 3, and 4 (high 
margin) and those with lower order quantities in conditions 2 and 5 (low 
margin) could obtain more profit. Notably, the average order under con-
dition 6 is 188 (as seen in Table A1 in the supplement), which is close to 
the optimal order 186 in this condition. Thus, a change in order quanti-
ties under condition 6 does not impact profits on average. 
To further break down the profitability implications of inventory 
sharing, we take our observations from conditions 3 and 4 as an exam-
ple (labeled as “Original” in Table 5) and compare the observed profit 
as well as the observed service level in these conditions with profits 
and service levels under several hypothetical counterfactuals. The coun-
terfactual scenarios are (1) if there was no sharing of inventory in this 
condition (with the same order quantities as in “Original”), (2) if there 
was no sharing of inventory and hence optimal newsvendor order quan-
tities were placed (= 230), (3) if transshipment decisions were made 
optimally (with the same order quantities as in “Original”), and (4) if 
transshipment decisions were made optimally (with optimal order quan-
tities factoring in transshipments (= 212/237) for both players). We fo-
cus on conditions 3 and 4 (high-margin, low and high transfer price, 
respectively) because inventory sharing is typically implemented for 
high-margin products, and demand-side underweighting leads to for-
gone profits for the high-margin conditions specifically. Under low-mar-
gin conditions, subjects tend to overorder under no sharing because 
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of the pull-to-center effect. Underordering behavior in inventory shar-
ing thus counterbalances the pull-to-center effect and pushes the order 
closer to the optimal. Results from the analysis on conditions 3 and 4 
are summarized in Table 5.  
Profit and service level comparisons between the “Original” and our 
counterfactual scenarios (1) and (2) indicate that the ability to share in-
ventory increases profitability (3,293 > 3,084 and 3,322 > 3,075) by a 
similar amount as ordering optimally would do in a no-sharing system 
(3,312 > 3,084 and 3,264 > 3,075). Service levels increase in condition 3 
(58.7% > 47.7%) as well as in condition 4 (66.1% > 55.9%) because of 
the increased inventory availability through transshipments. Note that 
in condition 4, this makes service levels comparable to optimal news-
vendor ordering (= 68.8%). 
Examining scenarios (3) and (4), we can determine that suboptimal 
requesting and sending have an impact on profitability, both in condi-
tion 3 (3,325 > 3,293)  and in condition 4 (3,369 > 3,322). By ordering 
the optimal quantity, we can see a further significant increase in profit-
ability for condition 3 (3,499 > 3,325) as well as for condition 4 (3,442 
> 3,369). Stated differently, in both conditions, on average, about $163 
of profits are foregone under inventory sharing because of ineffective 
requesting/transshipment decisions and suboptimal order quantities, 
where the latter aspect explains about 73% of this profit differential. 
Our analysis highlights that although inventory sharing does provide 
significant benefits, even for nonrational decision makers, a significant 
portion of the benefits of inventory sharing are not realized because or-
der quantities are too low in high-margin contexts and because sharing 
decisions are not made optimally. 
Table 5. Service Levels and Profitability in Conditions 3 and 4 with Counterfactuals 
                                                             No Sharing                                           Sharing
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4)
Condition  Outcome  Original  Optimal  Original  Optimal  Optimal sharing  
  orders  orders   sharing  & orders
C3  Service level  47.7%  66.7%  58.7%  59.9%  70.3%
 Profit  3,084  3,312  3,293  3,325  3,499
C4  Service level  55.9%  68.8%  66.1%  68.1%  83.2%
 Profit  3,075  3,264  3,322  3,369  3,442
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4.2.4. Replication with Decision Support. We replicated the high-mar-
gin treatments in a context with decision support. In practice, most in-
ventory managers have access to a decision-support tool when preparing 
their initial order quantities, but this tool rarely considers transship-
ments. Hence, we implemented this aspect by offering players a rec-
ommended order quantity (the optimal newsvendor order quantities 
derived from forecasts made by a single exponential smoothing model 
with a very low smoothing parameter) that they could accept or revise. 
This approach is similar to the decision-support treatment in Lee and 
Siemsen (2017). 
Our results (see Table A3 in the supplement) suggest that with deci-
sion support, average orders under the low transfer price with sharing 
are still less than the no-sharing average orders (b = −14.56, p ≤ 0.10), 
and the average orders are not significantly different between no sharing 
and the high transfer price setting (b = −7.42, p = 0.15). Thus, demand-
side underweighting bias persists even in the presence of decision sup-
port, where decision makers have the right to revise the system’s sug-
gested order quantity. 
4.3. Fixed Roles and Estimation of Behavioral Model 
In the preceding subsection, we provided evidence for a demand-side 
underweighting bias. In this subsection, we will quantify this bias with 
estimates (α and β) derived from the behavioral model developed in Sec-
tion 4.1. We conducted additional experiments for this purpose because 
the behavioral parameters in the model cannot be uniquely identified 
using data from the previous experiments. Different values of α and β 
could lead to similar model-implied order quantities. We thus introduce 
a fixed-role treatment in which we separated the roles among partici-
pants. Specifically, instead of allowing participants to be both sources 
and recipients of transshipped inventory, we randomly assigned them 
roles as either a source or a recipient throughout the experiment. Re-
cipient players saw only the supply side of inventory sharing, whereas 
source players saw only the demand side. This separation of roles al-
lows us to identify values of α and β by using an experimental treatment. 
4.3.1. Experiment Design. The experimental task in the fixed-role 
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treatment is the same as in our previous experiments. The key treat-
ment we introduce here is the assignment of fixed roles. In addition to 
their random assignment as either a source or a recipient throughout the 
experiment, a source player was randomly matched to a recipient player 
in his or her channel in each period. We also varied the transfer price as 
an experimental factor. Because our variable of interest now becomes 
the role assignment within this treatment, more subjects were recruited 
within the fixed-role treatment than in the previous treatments. We col-
lected data from 83 subjects across both transfer price treatments (44 
in the high transfer price treatment, 40 in the low transfer price treat-
ment). One subject in the high transfer price treatment left the experi-
ment before completion because of a medical emergency, and her data 
were removed from the analysis. Note also that the fixed-role treatment 
was run exclusively under the high-margin conditions because we have 
established that the different profit margin had little influence on the 
prevalence of supply-side and demand-side thinking. As a normative 
benchmark, recipient players should order 226 and 210 under transfer 
prices of 35 and 15, respectively, whereas source players should order 
241 and 232 under transfer prices of 35 and 15, respectively.  
4.3.2. Analysis. Our data analysis strategy is similar to the analysis in 
Section 4.2. One key difference in the analysis lies in our coding ap-
proach; although in Section 4.2 experimental conditions were dummy 
coded, we use dummy codes to represent experimental factors (e.g., 
three dummy variables—Recipient, Source, and TP = 35 to indicate the 
transfer price) in the fixed-role treatment. The main results from this 
model estimation are shown in Table 6. The results show that although 
the transfer price affects the orders of recipient players (b = 14.41, t = 
2.20, p ≤ 0.05), source players seem unaffected by the transfer price in 
their ordering behavior (b = −0.16, t = 0.02, p = 0.98). Further, recipient 
players across transfer price conditions have lower overall order quan-
tities than those of the recipient + source players (t = −1.63, p ≤ 0.10), 
whereas source players have similar overall order quantities as those 
of the recipient + source players (t = 0.45, p = 0.65). This observation is 
consistent with demand-side underweighting. Recipient players expe-
rience the supply side of inventory sharing, which leads them to lower 
order quantities; their order quantities increase as the potential of this 
supply-side benefit decreases with an increased transfer price. However, 
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source players see only the demand side of inventory sharing and do not 
react to the increased potential of the demand-side benefit as the trans-
fer price increases because of demand-side underweighting. 
4.3.3. Estimation of the Behavioral Model. Fixed roles allow us to dif-
ferentiate between the effects of overestimating the supply side of inven-
tory sharing and underestimating its demand side. Essentially, the fixed-
role experiment for the source players imposes α _ 0 and isolates the 
impact of β on source players’ ordering behaviors. Similarly, the fixed-
role experiment for recipient players essentially imposes β = 0 and iso-
lates the impact of α on recipient players’ ordering behaviors. 
To estimate our behavioral model, we need to account for the pull-
to-center effect in newsvendor experiments. In our high-margin setting, 
the pull-to-center effect also leads to underordering behavior. If the pull-
to-center effect is not accounted for, underordering would be attributed 
entirely to demand-side underweighting bias, leading to incorrect esti-
mates. Like Ho et al. (2010), we capture the pull-to-center effect in news-
vendor experiments by modeling the psychological cost of overage and 
underage, that is, δo and δu. Together, our behavioral model has the fol-
lowing behavior parameters, denoted as θ = (α, β, δo, δu). 
We included three experimental designs under both high/low trans-
fer prices (i.e., no sharing, sharing, fixed roles) for the estimation of θ = 
(α, β, δo, δu). Let Qn be the equilibrium order quantity from our behavioral 
Table 6. Regression Results for Fixed-Role Treatment
 Coef.   SE
Recipient  −9.44   (6.39)
Source  7.14   (6.33)
TP = 35  10.08   (5.99)
Recipient × TP = 35  4.33   (8.92)
Source × TP = 35  −10.24   (8.89)
Average demand (≤ 200)  0.71*   (0.30)
Average demand (> 200)  0.53*   (0.27)
Constant  54.89   (59.63)
N   133
R2   18%
The omitted category is recipient + source. Coef., coefficient; SE, standard error.
* p ≤ 0.05
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model for the no-sharing treatment, Qs,cij for the sharing treatment with 
transfer price cij, and Qss,cij and Qrs,cij the equilibrium order quantities with 
transfer price cij from our behavioral model for source and recipient 
players, respectively. Given parameter θ = (α, β, δo, δu), we can solve for 
a unique set of equilibrium order quantities (Qn, Qs,cij, Qrs,cij, Qss,cij ). Specif-
ically, Qn is given by the modified critical fractile; that is, 
 
Qn = F −1
 (     v − c + δu    )                                                                 v − s + δu + δo
The solution technique for (Qs,cij, Qrs,cij, Qss,cij ) is given in the supplement. 
The actual order quantities observed in the experiments may deviate 
from the prediction of our behavioral model because of noise in the play-
ers’ decision process. We assume that the average order quantity made 
by each subject is normally distributed, with the mean order quantity 
across subjects specified by our behavioral model; that is, 
qi,n ~N(Qn(θ), σ2n ), 
qi,s,cij ~N(Qs,cij(θ), σ2s,cij), 
qri,s,cij ~N (Qrs,cij (θ), σrs,cij 2), and 
qsi,s,cij ~N(Qss,cij (θ), σss,cij 2). 
The noise parameters σ2n, σ2s,cij, (σrs,cij)2, and (σss,cij)2 are specific to each 
treatment; the behavioral parameter θ is assumed to be common across 
all treatments. We use maximum likelihood to estimate the full behav-
ioral model and two nested models. The details of the estimation pro-
cedure are included in the supplement.  
The estimation results are shown in Table 7. Column (1) of the table 
shows the full behavioral model, which supports our expectation that 
β <1 (p < 0.01); that is, subjects underestimate how much they can sell 
to the other players. In addition, the results do not support α <1 (p = 
0.321); that is, subjects do not underestimate or overestimate the sup-
ply that is available from the other players. This finding implies that the 
observed underordering behavior can be mainly attributed to underes-
timation of the demand-side opportunity of selling through transship-
ments—players generally view transshipment as an additional source 
of supply instead. These parameter estimates further support the idea 
of demand-side underweighting bias when players have inventory shar-
ing opportunities. 
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The results of the two nested models are shown in columns (2) and 
(3) of Table 7. Column (2) shows the results of the model that does not 
allow for the psychological costs of overage/underage (i.e., δo = δu = 0), 
and column (3) shows the results of the model that does not allow for 
demand-side underweighting bias (i.e., α = β = 1). The likelihood-ratio 
(LR) test shows that the behavioral model that allows for both the psy-
chological cost of overage/underage and demand-side underweighting 
bias better explains the data than these two nested models. Without in-
corporating the psychological costs of overage/underage, which account 
for the pull-to-center effect, we will overstate the demand-side under-
weighting bias, as shown in column (2) of Table 7. 
The ratio of the estimated values for the psychological cost factors 
in column (3) of Table 7 is similar to that reported in Ho et al. (2010) 
(δu/δo= 0.65 in Ho et al. (2010) versus δu/δo= 0.71 in this study). How-
ever, when we introduced our behavioral factors α and β into the esti-
mation, this ratio changed. Column (1) in Table 7 shows that the ratio 
δu/δo drops to 0.35—in other words, the psychological costs of under-
age become even less salient once inventory sharing is factored into the 
decision-making process. It is possible that decision makers under in-
ventory sharing no longer attribute some of the responsibility for an in-
ventory shortage to themselves but to the other player. 
5. Exploring Root Causes and Possible Mitigation Strategies 
Table 7. Estimation Results of the Behavioral Model
Parameters  (1)  (2)  (3)
α  0.833  22.106
 (0.455)  (31.239)
β  0.198  4.931e-6
 (0.245)  (5.01e-6)
δo  12.540  34.243
 (12.567)  (25.680)
δu  4.443  24.256
 (13.564)  (26.382)
−ln L  704.382  748.717  707.142
LR test   χ2 = 88.67  χ2 = 5.52
  p ≤ 0.01  p ≤ 0.10
LR, likelihood ratio.
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In this section, we examine several potential underlying reasons for de-
mand-side underweighting and the resulting strategies to mitigate this 
bias. We begin by discussing existing theories for underordering be-
havior to see if they provide plausible explanations of such underor-
dering associated with inventory sharing, followed by more novel pro-
posed explanations (Section 5.1) combined with additional experiments 
to explore these explanations (Section 5.2). We then investigate several 
alternatives that may help mitigate demand-side underweighting (Sec-
tion 5.3). 
5.1. Root Causes 
In this subsection, we provide a systematic discussion of existing behav-
ioral theories to explain the observed underordering behavior (includ-
ing psychological costs of overstocking/understocking, mean anchoring, 
overconfidence, and risk aversion), followed by three proposed novel 
root causes underpinning demand-side underweighting. 
5.1.1. Existing Theories. Psychological costs of overstocking/ under-
stocking—a key explanation for the pull-to-center effect—could lead to 
underordering. To account for the psychological underage and overage 
costs, we deliberately included these factors in the estimation of our 
behavioral model in the fixed-role treatment. Our estimation results in-
dicate that the model incorporating demand-side underweighting bias 
better explains the data than the one with only psychological overage/
underage costs. More generally, if players experience strong psychologi-
cal overage costs, they will be hesitant to increase their orders in antici-
pation of potential transshipment demand. However, they should expect 
similar behavior from the other player; hence, they should not expect 
much supply-side benefit from inventory sharing either. Explaining de-
mand-side underweighting ultimately requires incorporating a behav-
ioral asymmetry between a player’s own behavior and the other play-
er’s behavior. 
Mean anchoring could also result in underordering for the high-mar-
gin treatments (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000). Given that the order de-
cision under inventory sharing is more complex than the order decision 
under no sharing, subjects may be more inclined to anchor on mean 
Z h a o ,  Xu ,  &  S i e m s e n  i n  M a n u fac t u r i n g  &  S v c  O p s  M g m t  ( 2 0 2 0 )        29
demand as a heuristic, resulting in an order quantity under inventory 
sharing that is closer to the mean demand (e.g., 200), that is, lower than 
the order quantity under no sharing. However, this argument cannot ex-
plain why participants reduce their inventory orders further (i.e., order 
further away from mean demand) under the low-margin sharing treat-
ments, as shown in Table 2. 
Overconfidence can also cause underordering (Ren and Croson 2013). 
Overconfidence implies that decision makers underestimate the stan-
dard deviation of the underlying demand distribution. In the inventory 
sharing context, this could, in turn, imply that players overestimate their 
own (and the other player’s) service level, thereby underestimating their 
own (and the other player’s) propensity to request inventory and over-
estimating the other player’s (and their own) propensity to have in-
ventory available. Notice, though, that the effect of overconfidence also 
seems symmetrical— it would lead to an underestimation of the poten-
tial of both the demand side and the supply side of inventory sharing; 
hence it does not appear to be able to explain our situation. 
Risk aversion could also lead to underordering because a risk-averse 
player may be reluctant to invest much into inventory for future uncer-
tain demand either of his or her own or through transshipments. How-
ever, our theoretical analysis of risk aversion suggests the opposite: a 
risk-averse player will order more inventory under sharing than under 
no sharing (see Figure A1 in the supplement). Inventory sharing lowers 
the supply chain risk of not matching demand and supply, thus encour-
aging a higher order quantity. More fundamentally, classical behavioral 
newsvendor theories, such as risk aversion, mostly focus on how human 
decision makers balance the uncertain demand and certain supply (the 
order will be delivered for sure) and do not differentiate the risk from 
the uncertain demand and uncertain supply. However, the observed un-
derordering behavior in our experiments points to an asymmetry: the 
risk of not being able to send excess inventory to the other player (i.e., 
uncertain demand) is more salient than the risk of not being able to re-
ceive inventory from the other player (i.e., uncertain supply). Therefore, 
any possible causes must explain such asymmetry and discuss how de-
cision makers balance uncertain supply and uncertain demand. 
5.1.2. Proposed Explanations. Having explored the preceding, we pro-
pose some additional causes for demand-side underweighting. Desire 
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for control over their environment (Leotti et al. 2010) can manifest in 
a preference for choice and sometimes even in a preference for the illu-
sion of control through choice. In our context, transshipments are not 
under the direct control of either player but require the consent of both 
players. However, according to the sequence of events, it is the recipient 
who initiates a transshipment with his or her request, and the source 
can only respond to this request. As such, decision makers may construe 
their ability to request additional inventory from the source as a way 
of controlling their environment (“If more customers show up than ex-
pected, I can always do something about this by asking for more inven-
tory from the other player!”). In contrast, the ability to sell inventory to 
the other player may appear to offer less control over the environment 
(“I surely can stock some extra units for the other player, but whether he 
or she requests them from me is out of my control”). In turn, this asym-
metry could lead to greater salience of the supply-side benefit of inven-
tory sharing during the decision-making process. 
Bias in others is easier for people to see than bias in themselves. 
Transshipments are impossible if the potential recipient does not re-
quest inventory from the source. However, asking for a supplementary 
inventory shipment is akin to asking for help. Seeking help may imply a 
degree of admitting one’s own incompetence and creates a form of de-
pendence on the other person (Lee 1997). Incompetence when mak-
ing a request means that the recipient admits having placed an insuffi-
cient initial order. Dependence when making a request implies that the 
recipient depends on the other player to satisfy his or her demand. In 
other words, requesting units for transshipments imposes an extra psy-
chological burden on the recipient; this would lead to less-than-opti-
mal requests, which is consistent with our finding in Table 3. Although 
this psychological burden applies to both a focal player and his or her 
counterpart, people often spot and perceive bias in others more than in 
themselves (Pronin et al. 2002)—“Although I am going to request when-
ever I need in order to take advantage of the sharing opportunity, I sus-
pect the other player may be reluctant to request from me.” In turn, this 
implies that decision makers may expect the other player to be reluc-
tant to request inventory from them, but they may not see themselves 
as reluctant to request inventory from the other player. This asymme-
try may cause decision makers to underweight the demand-side bene-
fit of inventory sharing. 
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Valuing one’s own market more than the other’s market may also lead 
to demand-side underweighting. Consumers value products in which 
they have invested effort more than those without their investment of 
effort (Norton et al. 2012). In Norton et al. (2012), subjects develop a 
particular valuation for the outcome of their manual labor; in our con-
text, we expect that subjects develop a particular valuation for the out-
come of their risky inventory investment. Although manual labor is dif-
ferent from inventory investment, both represent a form of effort. The 
logic underlying Norton et al. (2012) is built on the idea that “the more 
effort people put into some pursuit, the more they come to value it” and 
that the “successful completion of tasks [is] one crucial means by which 
people can meet their goal to feel competent and in control” (Norton et 
al. 2012, p. 454). In other words, people value the effort they put into a 
task, particularly if that effort leads to success. Fulfilling their own de-
mand out of ordered inventory can be construed as expanding effort to 
succeed in a task. Transshipping inventory to a receiver thus may be seen 
by subjects as supporting another player who failed in this task rather 
than as succeeding in their own task. Such a construal would lead to dif-
ferent valuations. 
5.2. Testing the Proposed Root Causes 
To test these three proposed causes, we conducted three additional 
treatments: minimum send, automated requesting, and sending reward. 
Each treatment is designed to manipulate a corresponding root cause 
(i.e., desire for control; see reluctance in requesting in others but not in 
oneself and valuing one’s own market more than the other’s market). 
By contrasting subjects’ orders under these three treatments with those 
under our original treatments from Section 4.2, we can explore which of 
the causes plays a role in subjects’ order decisions. 
5.2.1. Experiment Design. The original high margin sharing conditions 
from Section 4.2 are the baseline treatments underlying all factor vari-
ations in our new experiments. Under minimum send, a player who has 
extra units is guaranteed to be able to send up to five units that the other 
player must accept, even if the other player requests fewer than five 
units or does not request any units from the player. Such a treatment 
reduces the strategic uncertainty in the game and thereby increases a 
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subjects’ control over their uncertain environments by enabling them 
to send a minimum amount of excess inventory. 
Under automated requesting, our software will automatically request 
inventory at the optimal level for the player if he or she has a shortage 
instead of letting the player request himself or herself. Each player still 
decides whether and how much inventory he or she is willing to trans-
ship to the requesting player. This treatment tackles the second poten-
tial root cause of seeing a bias in others but not in oneself because re-
questing is now automated by software, and under-requesting will be 
eliminated. The concern that “others will not request” is now reduced. 
Under sending reward, for each unit of inventory the player sends to 
the other player, the player will receive not only a transfer price from 
the other player but also an additional five units of profit (paid from 
an external source) as a reward. This simulates, for example, the situa-
tion where a dealer receives a discount for his or her next order from a 
manufacturer every time he or she shares inventory to another dealer 
in need, as in Caterpillar’s dealer inventory sharing system (Zhao et al. 
2005). This additional reward should make the benefit of selling inven-
tory to the other player more salient. 
We ran these additional treatments under both high and low trans-
fer prices. We otherwise used the same subject pool and design as in 
our previous studies (although subjects who had participated in previ-
ous studies were not allowed to participate again). We collected data on 
134 additional subjects. 
5.2.2. Analysis. Our analysis in this section has to deal with two com-
plications. First, the minimum send and sending reward treatments 
manipulate the salience of the discussed root causes of demand-side 
underweighting but also shift the rational optimal order quantities. 
In particular, our theoretical analysis suggests that under minimum 
send (sending reward), a rational player should order 240 (239) and 
215 (216) under transfer prices of $35 and $15, respectively. In other 
words, compared with the baseline treatments in Section 4.2, minimum 
send and sending reward treatments should improve order quantities 
by roughly three units even among rational players. To disentangle the 
impact of the changed salience of the root causes from the rational re-
sponse to incentives, we employ a different outcome measure: OrderGapi 
= Orderi − OptimalOrderi, where Orderi represents the observed order, 
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and OptimalOrderi represents the corresponding optimal order for ra-
tional players. This dependent variable corrects observed order quanti-
ties for the differences that naturally exist between treatments because 
of changed optimal orders. 
Second, these new treatments also influence subjects’ transshipment 
decisions. Although in theory the actual transshipment decisions of an-
other player should not influence a focal player, participants are likely to 
react to such observed information as an increased extra supply through 
transshipments, which could lower the order quantities of a focal player. 
Similarly, increased observed extra demand from the other player could 
increase order quantities. For example, we expect that under the send-
ing reward treatment, subjects are more inclined to transship additional 
inventory because of the additional reward. Although our main interest 
is to examine whether this increased salience of the benefit of trans-
shipments increases order quantities because of demand-side thinking, 
subjects will also likely lower their order quantities because they have 
received more extra supplies from the other player. To estimate direct 
treatment effects, these indirect effects need to be accounted for in the 
analysis. Therefore, to measure the extra demand EDi available through 
transshipments, we calculate the average transshipment requests re-
ceived by a focal player. The extra supply ESi through transshipment is 
somewhat more intricate to measure because supply can only be sent 
upon request. We thus calculate the average transshipments received by 
a focal player over all time periods that he or she requested transship-
ments from his or her partner. Thus, EDi is averaged over all 30 time pe-
riods in the experiment, whereas ESi is averaged only over time periods 
where requests are made. Treatment averages for these two measures 
are summarized in Table A1 in the supplement. 
Because EDi and ESi depend on players’ order decisions, they are po-
tentially endogenous. To address this potential endogeneity issue, we 
constructed the average excess supply XSi (i.e., XSi = mean ([Order−i, t − 
Demand−i, t]+)) of a focal player’s partner as an instrument for ESi, and the 
average excess demand XDi (i.e., XDi = mean([Demand−i, t − Order−i, t]+)) 
of a focal player’s partner as an instrument for EDi, where −i represents 
focal player i’s partner. We believe that our instruments are exogenous 
because XSi and XDi are determined by the random demand draw of the 
partner, and the partner is also random matched every round. Further-
more, both instruments are relevant and strong because the first-stage 
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regression shows that EDi is predicted with an R2 of 80% (minimum ei-
genvalue statistic of 550), and ESi is predicted with an R2 of 54% (mini-
mum eigenvalue statistic of 20). Overidentification tests are not available 
because the equations are just identified. The results of two separate 
two-stage least squares regressions with either EDi or ESi being instru-
mented reveal that ESi is not endogenous (Wu-Hausman F = 0.06, p = 
0.81) but EDi is endogenous (Wu-Hausman F = 5.45, p ≤ 0.05). Let the 
three binary variables MINi, AUTORi, and REWARDi represent the three 
experiment designs (namely, minimum send, automated requesting, and 
send reward) and let Pi represent the transfer price. We thus simultane-
ously estimate the following system of equations using the generalized 
structural modeling procedure in Stata: 
                    OrderGapi = a11 Pi + a12 MINi + a13 Pi × MINi 
                                              + a14 AUTORi + a15 AUTORi × Pi 
                                              + a16 REWARDi + a17 REWARDi × Pi 
+ γ1D1i + γ2D2i + γ3EDi + γ4ESi + ϵ1,i                    (5)
 EDi = a21 Pi + a22 MINi + a23 Pi × MINi + a24 AUTORi 
                                  + a25 AUTORi ×Pi + a26 REWARDi 
+ a27 REWARDi × Pi + δ1XDi + ϵ2,i                                     (6)
 ESi = a31 Pi + a32 MINi + a33 Pi × MINi + a34 AUTORi 
                                  + a35 AUTORi × Pi + a36 REWARDi 
+ a37 REWARDi × Pi + δ2XSi + ϵ3,i                                     (7) 
Notably, we did not employ this form of analysis in our previous experi-
ment studies because their primary focus was to compare sharing with 
no-sharing treatments and the extra demand and extra supply variables 
are not defined under no-sharing treatments. 
The estimation results are shown in Table 8. As expected, the extra 
supply available through transshipments decreases order quantities (b 
= −0.51, p ≤ 0.01), whereas the extra demand available through trans-
shipments increases order quantities (b = 0.41, p ≤ 0.01). It is also ap-
parent that our treatments increased the extra supply available through 
transshipments under the low transfer price, whereas extra demand re-
mains mostly unaffected by our treatments. For instance, under a low 
transfer price, minimum send increases the average quantities received 
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through transshipment by 18 units and does not impact the average 
quantities demanded by partner players. Such an indirect counter ef-
fect of increased received supplies through transshipments will by it-
self lead to a decrease in order quantities. Therefore, minimum send 
only marginally improves the average order quantities compared with 
the corresponding base treatment (204 − 198 = 6; see Table A1 in the 
supplement).  
Once this indirect countereffect has been accounted for, we can estab-
lish the direct effects of our treatments. We observe a reduction in the 
gap between the actual and optimal orders for low transfer prices under 
minimum send (b = 16.37, p ≤ 0.01), automated requesting (b = 13.68, 
p ≤ 0.05), and sending reward (b = 18.78, p ≤0.01). There is no effect of 
our treatments under the high transfer price (the effect size for the three 
treatments under high transfer price can be obtained by adding the coef-
ficients of the treatment dummy and its interaction with transfer price). 
Thus, our treatments succeeded both in increasing order quantities as 
well as transshipments supplied under a low transfer price, a situation 
where the natural benefit of sending transshipments is low. By manipu-
lating the perceived control (minimum send), the reliance on the trans-
shipment partner’s making adequate requests (automated requesting) 
Table 8. Estimation Results in Testing Root Causes
                                                                        Order                        Extra supply                  Extra demand
Dependent variable Coef.  SE  Coef.  SE  Coef.  SE
TP = 35  0.42  (5.77)  23.41**  (2.72)  −0.21  (1.34)
Minimum Send  16.37**  (5.67)  18.46**  (2.79)  1.08  (1.37)
Minimum Send × TP = 35  −18.22*  (7.64)  −23.16**  (3.89)  −4.44*  (1.93)
Automatic Request  13.68*  (5.87)  20.85**  (2.82)  2.24  (1.40)
Automatic Request × TP = 35  −19.29**  (7.71)  −20.55**  (4.02)  −0.05  (2.00)
Sending Reward  18.78**  (5.78)  23.20**  (2.70)  0.69  (1.34)
Sending Reward × TP = 35  −27.32**  (7.38)  −15.92**  (3.89)  −1.81  (1.93)
Extra supply  −0.51**  (0.13)
Extra demand  0.41**  (0.13)
Average demand (≤200)  0.90**  (0.22)
Average demand (>200)  0.33†  (0.19)
Partner excess supply  0.40**  (0.07)
Partner excess demand  0.89**  (0.04)
Constant  −206.61**  (43.42)  −11.49**  (2.76)  1.28  (1.52)
N  184
Coef., coefficient; SE, standard error.
** p ≤ 0.01 ; * p ≤ 0.05 ; † p ≤ 0.10
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and increasing the value of the transshipment (sending reward), we suc-
ceeded in manipulating behavior in the expected direction. Our manip-
ulations suggest that all three root causes we mention seem valid; de-
mand-side underweighting thus does not appear as a phenomenon with 
a single root cause but is the result of several likely causes. This is not 
surprising, given that the pull-to-center effect in newsvendor decision 
making is also an empirical phenomenon with many likely causes. 
It is interesting that the same manipulations were not successful un-
der a high transfer price. This is surprising because, in principle, the 
same psychological barriers to recognizing the demand-side benefits of 
transshipments that are present under a low transfer price should also 
be present under a high transfer price. A possible explanation may be 
that ceiling effects kick in; given that order quantities are already higher 
under the high transfer price, participants are reluctant to cross a cer-
tain order quantity perceived as an upper limit of their orders. 
5.3. Additional Treatments 
To further explore ways to mitigate demand-side underweighting, we in-
vestigate three additional experimental treatments: the first one deals 
with the framing of the study; the second one deals with the sharing de-
cisions by automating both the requesting and the sending decisions 
(hence eliminating oversending and under-requesting behaviors); and 
the third one directly deals with the stocking decisions through an ad-
vanced decision-support system. 
First, it is plausible that the framing of our previous study has empha-
sized demand-side underweighting—subjects had to request inventory 
from the other players, which naturally emphasizes the supply-side ben-
efit. We will thus examine whether changing this frame allows us to de-
emphasize the supply-side benefit and emphasize the demand-side ben-
efit instead. We thus studied two additional alternative forms of framing 
the problem: customer-transfer framing and demand-side framing. Both 
frames are mathematically equivalent to our original frame and also 
practically relevant because they correspond to different ways to allow 
transshipments to happen. Under the customer-transfer frame, a deci-
sion maker directs his or her excess customers to the other player in-
stead of requesting extra inventory from the other player for these cus-
tomers. In other words, the recipient player does not receive inventory 
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from the source player to satisfy his or her demand. Instead, he or she 
sends such customers to the source, who then satisfies the demand (with 
a commission, i.e., the transfer price, to the recipient player). Note that 
all financial transactions are the same as in our original experiment in 
study 1 (so that the rational solution remains the same). This is akin to 
retail stores from the same firm asking their customers to stop by a dif-
ferent store to pick up inventory. We believe that this frame deempha-
sizes the supply-side benefit (because the recipient now sends custom-
ers away). Such transferred customers have no long-term implications 
for the recipients’ demand in our experiment (we told the subjects that 
sending away customers is a one-time occurrence with no implications 
for future demand). Nevertheless, this frame emphasizes the “lost busi-
ness” aspect of insufficient inventory. Thus, we expect this frame to lead 
to higher order quantities. 
Under the demand-side frame, transshipments are initiated when 
players propose to sell inventory to the other player instead of play-
ers requesting inventory to be transshipped. We believe that this frame 
emphasizes demand-side benefit because players now initiate the sales 
(instead of responding to a sales request from the other player). Hence, 
compared with the original frame, this should increase the players’ or-
der quantities. 
We also designed a treatment with automated requesting and send-
ing, under which the software will automatically make the optimal re-
questing/sending decisions. Under such a treatment, control over the 
demand side and supply side have been equally rendered to the soft-
ware. Therefore, subjects do not have to worry about the other player’s 
reluctance and irrationality in both requesting and sending. As a result, 
subjects can feed unbiased information about the inventory availability 
of the system into their ordering systems, which used to be inflated be-
cause of the underrequesting and oversending behaviors. We thus be-
lieve that underordering could be mitigated. 
Finally, akin to Bolton et al. (2012), we designed a new decision-sup-
port treatment, under which we told our subjects the optimal order 
quantity. Specifically, given the transfer price of $35 ($15), the subjects 
are told that the optimal order quantity should be 237 (212). In addition, 
we also provided subjects with a plot of the expected profit under dif-
ferent order quantities to ensure that they understand the optimality of 
the suggested optimal order. Nevertheless, as in practice, subjects could 
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choose to accept the suggested optimal order quantity or to override it. 
5.3.1. Experiment Design. Conditions 3 and 4 from Section 4.2 are 
again the baseline treatments underlying all factor variations here. Un-
der the customer-transfer frame, instead of asking for supplementary 
inventory orders from a source, we ask players, “How many customers 
do you want to send to the other player?”. Source players were then told, 
“Please enter the number of customers you are willing to serve for the 
other player.” The transfer price was explained as “the amount you have 
to give to the other player for serving each unit of your own customer 
demand.” Under the demand-side frame, we asked players, “How much 
inventory do you want to offer to sell to the other player?”. Design and 
subject pool were otherwise similar to our previous work. We collected 
data from 186 additional subjects who participated across the eight (= 
4 × 2) new treatments we ran.  
5.3.2. Analysis. The analysis is like that in Section 5.2. Table 9 con-
tains our estimation results. When comparing the order quantities un-
der customer transfer with order quantities under our original framing, 
it becomes clear that with the low transfer price, inventory orders are 
increased in the customer-transfer framing (p ≤ 0.01). They remain sim-
ilar under the high transfer price (p = 0.71). This result is as expected. In 
the low transfer price scenario, in which supply-side benefits are most 
salient, reframing the setting clearly decreases this salience and leads 
to inventory order levels that are no different from newsvendor orders 
without sharing inventory. In the high transfer price setting, in which a 
supply-side benefit has little salience to begin with, customer transfer 
has no further effect.   
Although our expectations for the customer-transfer setting are sup-
ported by the data from the new experiments, our expectations for in-
creased order quantities under the demand-side frame are not sup-
ported. Order quantities under the low transfer price here do not change 
compared with the original frame (p = 0.17) and do not change under 
the high transfer price either (p = 0.97). This is again the result of the in-
direct countereffect we discussed in the preceding section. In particular, 
under the demand-side frame, participants offered too much inventory 
to the other player (whereas under the original frame, supplementary 
order requests were generally 4.5 units less than the optimum; under 
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the demand-side frame, people, on average, offered 12 units more than 
optimal to the other player). In other words, the frame changed the set-
ting from people under-requesting to people oversending inventory. This 
leads to the very rational perceptions of players that more than optimal 
inventory is available from the other player through transshipments, em-
phasizing a supply-side benefit, in turn, and hence reduced initial order 
quantities. This effect seems to offset any additional framing effects that 
may be present. Indeed, the average number of units transshipped un-
der demand-side framing is 14, which is much higher than the average 
of nine units transshipped under the supply side framing. 
The order quantities under automated requesting and sending in-
crease by 10.58 units (p < 0.05) under the low transfer price and in-
crease by 4.41 units (p = 0.37) under the high transfer price compared 
with the order quantities under our original framing in Section 4.2. In 
particular, the order quantity under the high transfer price is slightly 
higher than the order quantity under the no-sharing treatment in Section 
Table 9. Estimation Results in Additional Treatments
                                                                          Order                    Extra supply            Extra demand
Dependent variable Coef.  SE  Coef.  SE  Coef.  SE
TP = 35  14.89**  (5.33)  23.73**  (3.45)  −0.89  (2.22)
Demand side  8.16  (6.06)  41.85**  (3.32)  −5.77**  (2.16)
Demand side × TP = 35  −7.97  (6.94)  −20.12**  (4.76)  −3.53  (3.09)
Customer transfer  13.41**  (5.43)  23.96**  (3.50)  1.62  (2.26)
Customer × TP = 35  −11.60†  (7.23)  −22.06**  (4.91)  −5.58†  (3.19)
Automatic Request & Send  10.58*  (5.17)  16.64**  (3.52)  1.79  (2.26)
Automatic Request & Send×TP=35  −6.17  (7.25)  −24.10**  (4.91)  −0.06  (3.18)
Decision support v.2  16.41**  (5.29)  20.56**  (3.51)  1.49  (2.29)
Decision support v.2 × TP = 35  −12.48†  (7.46)  −25.33**  (5.04)  −1.02  (3.27)
Extra supply  −0.13  (0.09)
Extra demand  0.11  (0.11)
Average demand (≤200)  1.15**  (0.18)
Average demand (>200)  0.39*  (0.19)
Partner excess supply    0.35**  (0.10)
Partner excess demand      0.72**  (0.06)
Constant  −34.61  (36.38)  −10.03**  (3.63)  7.12  (2.49)
N    236
Coef., coefficient; SE, standard error.
† p ≤ 0.10 ; * p ≤ 0.05 ; ** p ≤ 0.01
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4.2, which is a sign of overcoming the pattern of underordering. Thus, 
not only does automated requesting and sending correct the bias in sub-
jects’ transshipment decisions, but it also mitigates the underordering 
behavior in their initial stocking decisions. 
It is also clear that the decision-support tool generally increases or-
der quantities, with an increase of 16.41 units (p < 0.01) under the low 
transfer price setting and an increase of 3.93 units (p = 0.44) under the 
high transfer price setting compared with the original framing in Sec-
tion 4.2. Nevertheless, the increase in order quantities is not significant 
under the high transfer price setting despite the fact that subjects are 
explicitly told that the optimal order quantity should be 237 units. This 
indicates that the bias is so strong that the subjects are willing to leave 
money on the table (possibly because of the ceiling effect we mentioned 
that subjects are not willing to order above a certain level); hence, some 
intervention or education is needed to increase subjects’ compliance 
with such a decision-support tool. 
6. Conclusion 
The analytical modeling literature on inventory sharing has emphasized 
that this practice has the potential to simultaneously reduce inventory 
and increase service levels (e.g., Tagaras 1989, Evers 2001). However, 
this literature has always assumed rational decision makers and has not 
considered that human decision makers can exhibit biased decision mak-
ing. Using four behavioral studies, we found persistent and significant 
underordering behavior among decision makers when provided with in-
ventory sharing opportunities. Such behavior persisted even when de-
cision makers had a decision-support system that suggested inventory 
order quantities but permitted them to make revisions (the typical prac-
tice in industry). We identified demand-side underweighting as one ev-
ident underlying bias behind this underordering behavior. Specifically, 
inventory sharing should confer a supply-side benefit (that others may 
become an extra source of supply) and a demand-side benefit (that oth-
ers may also become a secondary market to whom to sell extra inven-
tory). However, its demand-side benefit is largely underestimated by 
decision makers. Inventory sharing is perceived as rather a supply-side 
than a demand-side phenomenon. For high-margin products, such un-
derordering exacerbates the already low orders caused by pull-to-center 
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behavior and can lead to much foregone benefit from risk pooling, as ev-
idenced by limited improvement of service levels and profits. For low-
margin products, such underordering counterbalances the pull-to-cen-
ter behavior and may drive the order quantity closer to optimal. 
Our work provides some important managerial insights: First, unless 
human behavior is considered, inventory sharing systems may forego a 
portion of their promised risk-pooling benefits. Thus, during the imple-
mentation of such systems, the demand-side benefits of the system need 
to be emphasized for decision makers. This may be achieved through (1) 
appropriate emphasis to overcome demand-side underweighting bias, 
(2) more robust decision-support systems with transshipment consid-
eration to suggest stocking level, and (3) providing guidelines or auto-
mation of the inventory requesting and sending decisions to signal the 
correct inventory availability of the system. Second, although the mod-
eling literature emphasizes that to take advantage of risk pooling, initial 
stock levels should be revised after inventory sharing opportunities are 
provided, preventing decision makers from dramatic reductions in their 
inventory appears more important from a behavioral perspective. Third, 
the unwillingness of participants to share their inventory does not ap-
pear to be a major cause of the breakdown of inventory systems. More 
blame seems to lie with overall insufficient inventory in the system cou-
pled with players’ reluctance to request adequate inventory from oth-
ers through transshipments. To improve the system, equal importance 
is warranted to guiding the initial ordering process as well as to help-
ing encourage reasonable requests. 
As one of the first studies to consider inventory sharing from a behav-
ioral perspective, our study opens many directions to explore. For exam-
ple, to separate the impact of demand uncertainty, we look at a setting 
in which there is no residual demand uncertainty when transshipments 
are requested. In reality, decision makers often need to decide whether 
they will share with others when their demand is not yet fully realized, 
making a trade-off between the sharing opportunity now and potential 
lost sales in one’s market in the future because of demand uncertainty. 
Further, this research context provides a clear opportunity to study so-
cial preferences as well as social comparison effects. The act of sharing 
may make people sensitive to the other players’ outcomes, whereas the 
mere ability to observe decisions and outcomes from the other players 
on a platform may lead to explicit or implicit performance comparisons. 
In addition, future research may further explore the root causes of de-
mand-side underweighting by surveying participants through verbal 
protocol analysis such as the one reported in Gavirneni and Isen (2010). 
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We hope that our research will lead to more behavioral studies in this 
interesting area. 
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Endnotes 
1 The survey has parts focused on inventory management, forecasting, supply chain manage-
ment, and sales and operations planning. To reduce time requirements, respondents an-
swered only one of these four parts. 
2  Note that this choice of parameters for the normal demand distribution scales the parame-
ters from RKP by a factor of two. This deviation from RKP occurred because our original de-
sign included a model in which demand revelation was split into two stages. The resulting 
experiments were removed from this paper to reduce complexity. 
References 
Alishah EJ, Moinzadeh K, Zhou Y (2017) Store fulfillment strategy for an omni-
channel retailer. Working paper, Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA. 
Anupindi R, Bassok Y, Zemel E (2001) A general framework for the study of 
decentralized distribution systems. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 
3(4):349–368. 
Bolton GE, Ockenfels A, Thonemann UW (2012) Managers and students as 
newsvendors. Management Sci. 58(12):2225–2233. 
Bostian AA, Holt CA, Jain S, Ramdas K (2012) Is transshipment a behaviorally-robust 
risk-pooling strategy? Working paper, University of Tampere, Tampere, Finland. 
Chen K-Y, Li S (2020) The commitment conundrum of inventory sharing. Production 
Oper. Management 29(2):353–370. 
Dong L, Rudi N (2004) Who benefits from transshipment? Exogenous vs. 
endogenous wholesale prices. Management Sci. 50(5):645–657. 
Evers PT (2001) Heuristics for assessing emergency transshipments. Eur. J. Oper. 
Res. 129(2):311–316. 
Fischbacher U (2007) z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. 
Z h a o ,  Xu ,  &  S i e m s e n  i n  M a n u fac t u r i n g  &  S v c  O p s  M g m t  ( 2 0 2 0 )        43
Experiment. Econom. 10(2):171–178. 
Gallagher, E (2002) One stop co-op, discover how Johnstone Supply, a lead wholesale 
distribution company, uses a cooperative business model and succeeds. US Bus. 
Rev. December:1–6. 
Gavirneni S, Isen AM (2010) Anatomy of a news vendor decision: Observations from 
a verbal protocol analysis. Production Oper. Management 19(4):453–462. 
Ho T-H, Lim N, Cui TH (2010) Reference dependence in multilocation newsvendor 
models: A structural analysis. Management Sci. 56(11):1891–1910. 
Hyndman K, Embrey M (2018) The econometrics of experiments. Katok E, Leider S, 
Donohue K, eds. Handbook of Behavioral Operations Management (John Wiley & 
Sons, Hoboken, NJ), 35–88. 
Lee F (1997) When the going gets tough, do the tough ask for help? Help seeking 
and power motivation in organizations. Organ. Behav. Human Decision Processes 
72(3):336–363. 
Lee YS, Siemsen E (2017) Task decomposition and newsvendor decision making. 
Management Sci. 63(10):3226–3245. 
Leotti LA, Iyengar SS, Ochsner KN (2010) Born to choose: The origins and value of 
the need for control. Trends Cognitive Sci. 14(10):457–463. 
Narus JA, Anderson JC (1996) Rethinking distribution: Adaptive channels. Harvard 
Bus. Rev. 74(4):112–120. 
Norton MI, Mochon D, Ariely D (2012) The IKEA effect: When labor leads to love. J. 
Consumer Psych. 22(3):453–460. 
Pronin E, Lin DY, Ross L (2002) The bias blind spot: Perceptions of bias in self vs. 
others. Personality Soc. Psych. Bull. 28(3):369–381. 
Ren Y, Croson R (2013) Overconfidence in newsvendor orders: An experimental 
study. Management Sci. 59(11):2502–2517. 
Rong Y, Snyder LV, Sun Y (2010) Inventory sharing under decentralized preventive 
transshipments. Naval Res. Logist. 57(6):540–562. 
Rudi N, Kapur S, Pyke DF (2001) A two-location inventory model with 
transshipment and local decision making. Management Sci. 47(12):1668–1680. 
Schweitzer ME, Cachon GP (2000) Decision bias in the newsvendor problem 
with a known demand distribution: experimental evidence. Management Sci. 
46(3):404–420. 
Shao J, Krishnan H, McCormick ST (2011) Incentives for transshipment in a supply 
chain with decentralized retailers. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 
13(3):361–372. 
Tagaras G (1989) Effects of pooling on the optimization and service levels of two-
location inventory systems. IIE Trans. 21(3):250–257. 
van Donselaar KH, Gaur V, Van Woensel T, Broekmeulen RA, Fransoo JC (2010) 
Ordering behavior in retail stores and implications for automated replenishment. 
Management Sci. 56(5):766–784. 
Villa S, Katok E (2018) Negotiating transfer prices for improving supply chain 
transshipments. Working paper, University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas. 
Z h a o ,  Xu ,  &  S i e m s e n  i n  M a n u fac t u r i n g  &  S v c  O p s  M g m t  ( 2 0 2 0 )         44
Yan X, Zhao H (2011) Technical note—Decentralized inventory sharing with 
asymmetric information. Oper. Res. 59(6):1528–1538. 
Zhang Y, Siemsen E (2019) A meta-analysis of newsvendor experiments: Revisiting 
the pull-to-center asymmetry. Production Oper. Management 28(1):140–156. 
Zhao H, Bisi A (2010) Optimal operating policies in a commodity trading market 
with the manufacturer’s presence. Naval Res. Logist. 57(2):127–148. 
Zhao H, Deshpande V, Ryan JK (2005) Inventory sharing and rationing in 
decentralized dealer networks. Management Sci. 51(4):531–547. 
Zhao H, Deshpande V, Ryan JK (2006) Emergency transshipment in decentralized 
dealer networks: When to send and accept transshipment requests. Naval Res. 
Logist. 53(6):547–567.  
Appendix I: Tables and Figures 
Table A1: Summary of Experimental Data 
Treatment 
Transfer 
Price 
N Order Profit 
Extra 
Supply 
Extra 
Demand 
No Sharing - High Margin - 26 209.74 3220.00 0.00 0.00 
No Sharing - Low Margin - 24 194.07 1040.31 0.00 0.00 
Sharing - High Margin 35 24 206.89 3321.79 25.93 27.97 
Sharing - High Margin 15 26 197.79 3293.09 15.41 31.71 
Sharing - Low Margin 35 26 187.50 1285.23 23.42 33.10 
Sharing - Low Margin 15 26 185.80 1295.06 18.89 39.47 
No Sharing - Dec. Support - 20 225.30 3155.78 0.00 0.00 
Sharing - Dec. Support 35 20 216.22 3333.22 24.80 21.07 
Sharing - Dec. Support 15 20 209.43 3374.50 24.69 26.21 
Fixed Role 35 43 201.28 3051.42 30.94 15.63 
Fixed Role 15 40 194.96 3100.98 36.85 21.72 
Minimum Send 35 24 208.07 3231.78 22.31 25.69 
Minimum Send 15 22 203.84 3226.20 21.49 31.80 
Auto Request 35 20 199.69 3208.97 26.07 31.64 
Auto Request 15 20 198.75 3268.60 22.09 34.14 
Sending Reward 35 24 201.60 3443.90 31.04 30.12 
Sending Reward 15 24 201.84 3339.01 25.14 28.38 
Customer Transfer 35 24 206.66 3116.69 28.80 24.84 
Customer Transfer 15 22 208.01 3221.50 25.55 31.21 
Demand Side 35 26 200.09 3231.44 47.02 26.52 
Demand Side 15 26 197.02 3244.62 42.31 28.39 
Auto Request & Send 35 24 213.53 3376.50 19.54 28.93 
Auto Request & Send 15 22 203.29 3285.76 18.75 32.39 
Decision Support v.2 35 20 212.94 3391.38 21.27 26.52 
Decision Support v.2 15 22 210.07 3405.44 22.42 28.39 
 
Notes. While in general, the average extra supply is below the extra average demand, the opposite can be true as well. Extra 
supply is averaged only over time periods where requests were made, since extra supply must be zero otherwise. Extra demand 
is averaged over all time periods, since requests can be made in any period. This difference in the denominator can lead to 
average extra supply being greater than average extra demand. Further, the sequencing of extra demand/supply is revered in 
the Demand Side treatment, leading to extra demand being less than extra supply. 
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Table A2: The Effects of Treatment and Order Quantity on Profitability 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef. SE Coef. SE 
C2: Low Margin – No Sharing -2019.42** (54.85) -2032.76** (48.02) 
C3: High Margin – Low Transfer Price 185.40** (53.54) 174.74** (46.75) 
C4: High Margin – High Transfer Price 223.91** (54.36) 211.51** (47.52) 
C5: Low Margin – Low Transfer Price -1780.49** (53.46) -1787.76** (46.65) 
C6: Low Margin – High Transfer Price -1792.59** (53.56) -1805.65** (46.75) 
     
Order Quantity @ C1   4.34** (1.66) 
Order Quantity @ C2   -2.72* (1.38) 
Order Quantity @ C3   5.43** (1.74) 
Order Quantity @ C4   7.79** (1.71) 
Order Quantity @ C5   -3.95** (1.27) 
Order Quantity @ C6   0.31 (1.46) 
     
Average Demand (≤200) 11.17** (2.77) 9.66** (2.57) 
Average Demand (>200) 16.52** (2.05) 14.96** (1.88) 
Demand Standard Deviation -11.45**  -12.21** (1.41) 
Constant 1593.91** (555.6) 1963.08** (515.6) 
N 152 152 
R2 97% 98% 
Notes. ** p≤0.01. The omitted category is Condition 1, i.e. the high margin, no sharing condition. 
 
Table A3: Robustness Test with Decision Support 
 Coef. SE 
C3*: High Margin – Low Transfer Price -14.56** (5.18) 
C4*: High Margin – High Transfer Price -7.42 (5.09) 
   
Average Demand (≤200) 0.73** (0.35) 
Average Demand (>200) 0.42** (0.30) 
Constant 78.96 (67.11) 
N 60 
R2 29% 
Notes. **p≤0.01. C3* indicates that this condition is similar to C3 with the 
addition of decision support. The omitted category is C1*. All coefficients 
measure differences in order quantities compared to this condition. 
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Figure A1: Comparison of Order Quantities in the Sharing and No-sharing Situations under 
Risk-Aversion 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Screen Shots of the Base Study - Initial Stocking Decision 
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Figure A3: Screen Shots of the Base Study - Requesting Decision  
 
  
 
Figure A4: Screen Shots of the Base Study - Sending Decision 
 
 
Appendix II: Representative Instructions for Experiment (Base Study, Condition 3)  
This is an experiment in inventory decision making. During the experiment, you will play a game from 
which you will receive cash earnings based on your performance. Upon completion of the game, you 
will be paid your total earnings in cash plus a $5 show-up fee. If you have any questions, feel free to 
raise your hand and we will assist you. Please do not communicate with other participants in the game, 
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and please refrain from using your cell phones. 
Description of the Game. You are a retailer selling a product. To be able to sell the product, you must 
first place inventory orders in advance of knowing the exact customer demand for that period. If the 
realized customer demand during the selling period is less than the number of units you order (Order > 
Demand), there will be some units that you ordered but cannot sell. While leftover units can be salvaged 
at a price which is below the cost to order units, these units do not carry over to the next selling period. 
Conversely, if the customer demand is greater than the number of units ordered (Demand > Order), 
there will be some consumer demand that cannot be met. 
There will be a total of 30 selling periods for your product. You will be randomly matched with a new 
player in each selling period. After demand in a selling period is revealed, you will get a chance to 
request additional inventory from that other player, and the other player will be provided with a similar 
opportunity. Your goal is to maximize your total profits over all 30 selling periods. 
Revenue/Cost Information 
Retail Price (the amount you will receive for each unit sold to consumers):   40 
Transfer Price (the amount you receive from the other player for each unit transferred):  15 
Salvage Price (the amount you will receive for each unit that you do not sell or transfer):  10 
Procurement Cost (the amount you have to pay per unit originally ordered):   20 
Lost Sales Cost (the amount you have to pay per customer demand not met):   0 
Transhipment Cost (the cost you have to pay to transfer a unit to the other player):  0 
 
The other players with whom you will be matched face the same price/cost parameters. 
 
Demand Information. Demand in each selling period is drawn from a Normal Probability Distribution. 
Average demand is 200, with a standard deviation of 70.71. Demand in one selling period is 
uncorrelated with demand in the next period.  
Payoffs. The computer program will calculate your profits in every selling period. Your cash earning 
in each selling period will be approximately 
Real Cash Earning ($) = Profits x 0.0095%. 
For example, if your Profits in a turn are equal to 3500, your Real Cash Earnings that period will be 
about 33 cents. Note that your cash earnings will be negative if your profit for that round goes below 0. 
Your total cash earnings in this experiment will be $6 plus your total cash earnings for the 30 decisions 
rounds. The computer program will calculate your cash earnings for each selling period and your total 
cash earnings for all the periods you have completed. We will pay your total earnings upon the 
completion of the game by rounding them to the highest dollar amount and making sure that you receive 
at least $6 (show-up fee). The maximum Earnings that we will pay out per participant is $24. 
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Appendix III: Proof of Proposition 1 
To solve the optimal order 𝑄𝑠(𝛼, 𝛽), we partition the demand space (𝐷1, 𝐷2) as shown below. 
 
Given realized demand (𝐷1, 𝐷2) in each of the regions of the above figure, the corresponding 
transshipment (𝑇𝑖𝑗 , 𝑇𝑗𝑖), shortage (𝑍𝑖 , 𝑍𝑗), leftover (𝐿𝑖 , 𝐿𝑗) and sales (𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑗) are summarized below. 
 Transship(𝑇𝑖𝑗 , 𝑇𝑗𝑖) Shortage (𝑍𝑖 , 𝑍𝑗) Leftover (𝐿𝑖, 𝐿𝑗) Sales (𝑅𝑖 , 𝑅𝑗) 
𝛺1 0,0 0,0 𝑄𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖, 𝑄𝑗 − 𝐷𝑗 𝐷𝑖, 𝐷𝑗 
𝛺2 0, 𝐷𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖 0,0 0, 𝑄𝑖 + 𝑄𝑗 − 𝐷𝑖 − 𝐷𝑗 𝐷𝑖, 𝐷𝑗 
𝛺41 0, 𝐷𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖 0, 𝐷𝑖 + 𝐷𝑗 − 𝑄𝑖 − 𝑄𝑗 0,0 𝐷𝑖, 𝑄𝑗 + 𝑄𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖 
𝛺42 0, 𝛼(𝐷𝑗 − 𝐷𝑗) 𝐷𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖 − 𝛼(𝑄𝑗 − 𝐷𝑗), 
𝐷𝑗 − 𝑄𝑗 + 𝛼(𝑄𝑗 − 𝐷𝑗) 
0,0 𝑄𝑖 + 𝛼(𝑄𝑗 − 𝐷𝑗), 
𝑄𝑗 − 𝛼(𝑄𝑗 − 𝐷𝑗) 
𝛺3,51 𝛽(𝐷𝑗 − 𝑄𝑗),0 0, (1 − 𝛽)(𝐷𝑗 − 𝑄𝑗) 𝑄𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖 − 𝛽(𝐷𝑗 − 𝑄𝑗), 0 𝐷𝑖, 𝑄𝑗 + 𝛽(𝐷𝑗 − 𝑄𝑗) 
𝛺52 𝑄𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖, 0 0, 𝐷𝑗 + 𝐷𝑖 − 𝑄𝑗 − 𝑄𝑖) 0,0 𝐷𝑖, 𝑄𝑗 + 𝑄𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖 
𝛺6 0,0 𝐷𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖 , 𝐷𝑗 − 𝑄𝑗 0,0 𝑄𝑖, 𝑄𝑗 
Hence, player i’s expected profit is 
𝛱𝑖(𝑄𝑖 , 𝑄𝑗; 𝛼, 𝛽) = ∫ (𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑇𝑖𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑇𝑗𝑖)𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑑𝐷𝑗
𝛺
− 𝑐𝑖𝑄𝑖. 
Thus, we have the following first-order condition with respect to 𝑄𝑖,  
𝜕𝛱𝑖(𝑄𝑖, 𝑄𝑗; 𝛼, 𝛽)
𝜕𝑄𝑖
= 𝑣𝑖𝑃𝑟(Ω42  + Ω6) + 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑃𝑟(Ω2  + Ω41  + Ω52) + 𝑠𝑖𝑃𝑟(Ω1  + Ω3  + Ω51) − 𝑐𝑖 
Since both players are symmetric, we have 𝑄𝑖 = 𝑄𝑗 = 𝑄𝑠(𝛼, 𝛽) at equilibrium. Thus, we can solve 
𝑄𝑠(𝛼, 𝛽)  through the above first-order condition 𝜕𝛱𝑖(𝑄𝑖 , 𝑄𝑗; 𝛼, 𝛽) 𝜕𝑄𝑖⁄ = 0 . Next, we show that 
𝑄𝑠(𝛼, 𝛽) decreases as 𝛼 increases and decreases as 𝛽 decreases.  
Based on the derivative of implicit function, we have 
𝜕𝑄(𝛼,𝛽)
𝜕𝛼
= −
𝜕2𝛱
𝜕𝑄𝜕𝛼
/
𝜕2𝛱
𝜕𝑄2
. Since 
𝜕2𝛱
𝜕𝑄2
< 0 at the 
optimal 𝑄𝑠(𝛼, 𝛽), it suffices to show that 
𝜕2𝛱
𝜕𝑄𝜕𝛼
< 0. We have  
𝜕2𝛱
𝜕𝑄𝜕𝛼
= 𝑣𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑟(Ω42)
𝜕𝛼
 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝑟(Ω41)
𝜕𝛼
= −(𝑣𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖𝑗)
𝜕 Pr(Ω41)
𝜕𝛼
< 0, 
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Therefore, we have proved that 𝑄𝑠(𝛼, 𝛽) decreases as 𝛼 increases.  
Likewise, we can show that   
𝜕2𝛱
𝜕𝑄𝜕𝛽
= 𝑠𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑟(Ω51)
𝜕𝛽
 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝑟(Ω52)
𝜕𝛽
= (𝑐𝑖𝑗 − 𝑠𝑖)
𝜕 Pr(Ω52)
𝜕𝛽
> 0 
Thus, we have proved that 𝑄𝑠(𝛼, 𝛽) decreases as 𝛽 decreases. By definition, for rational players, 
𝑄𝑠
∗  =  𝑄𝑠(𝛼 = 1, 𝛽 = 1). Hence, when 𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽 < 1, we have 𝑄𝑠
∗ > 𝑄𝑠(𝛼, 𝛽); and when 𝛼 > 1 
and 𝛽 = 1, we have 𝑄𝑠
∗ > 𝑄𝑠(𝛼, 𝛽). 
 
Appendix IV: Structural Estimation of the Behavioral Model 
Given a set of behavioral parameters 𝜃 = (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿𝑜, 𝛿𝑢), we can solve the equilibrium order quantity 
predicted by the behavioral model. In particular, for the no-sharing case, we can solve 𝑄𝑛 through the 
modified critical fractile formula 𝑄𝑛  =  𝐹
−1 (
 𝑣−𝑐+𝛿𝑢
𝑣−𝑠+𝛿𝑢 +𝛿𝑜
). 
For the inventory sharing case, we can solve the predicted order quantity 𝑄𝑠(𝜃)  through the 
following first-order condition, 
𝜕𝛱𝑠
𝜕𝑄𝑠
= (𝑣 + 𝛿𝑢) Pr(Ω42 + Ω6) + 𝑐𝑖𝑗 Pr(Ω2 + Ω41 + Ω52) + (𝑠 − 𝛿𝑜) Pr(Ω1 + Ω3 + Ω51) − 𝑐 = 0 
For the fixed role treatment, we can solve the predicted order quantity for the recipient, i.e., 𝑄𝑠
𝑟(𝜃), 
through the following first-order condition,  
𝜕𝛱𝑠
𝑟
𝜕𝑄𝑠
𝑟 = (𝑣 + 𝛿𝑢) Pr(Ω42 + Ω6) + 𝑐𝑖𝑗 Pr(Ω2 + Ω41) + (𝑠 − 𝛿𝑜) Pr(Ω1 + Ω3 + Ω5) − 𝑐 = 0, 
and solve the predicted order quantity for the source, i.e., 𝑄𝑠
𝑠(𝜃), through the following first-order 
condition,  
𝜕𝛱𝑠
𝑠
𝜕𝑄𝑠
𝑠 = (𝑣 + 𝛿𝑢) Pr(Ω2 + Ω4 + Ω6) + 𝑐𝑖𝑗 Pr(Ω52) + (𝑠 − 𝛿𝑜) Pr(Ω1 + Ω3 + Ω51) − 𝑐 = 0 
Note that 𝛺4 = Ω41 ∪ Ω42 , 𝛺5 = Ω51 ∪ Ω52 . Essentially, given a set of parameters 𝜃 =
(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿𝑜, 𝛿𝑢), we can solve predicted order quantity (𝑄𝑛, 𝑄𝑠, 𝑄𝑠
𝑟, 𝑄𝑠
𝑠). The observed order quantities in 
the experiments, however, do not perfectly coincide with the model predictions due to various noises 
at players’ decision processes. To capture the variation of the observed order quantities, we assume that 
the average order quantity placed by a player i in the experiments is normally distributed with mean 
specified by the behavioral model predication, i.e., 
𝑞𝑖,𝑛~𝑁(𝑄𝑛(𝛿𝑜, 𝛿𝑢), 𝜎𝑛
2) 
𝑞𝑖,𝑠,𝑐𝑖𝑗~𝑁 (𝑄𝑠,𝑐𝑖𝑗(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿𝑜, 𝛿𝑢), 𝜎𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑗
2 ) 
𝑞𝑖,𝑠,𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑟 ~𝑁 (𝑄𝑠,𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑟 (𝛼, 𝛿𝑜, 𝛿𝑢), (𝜎𝑠,𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑟 )
2
) 
𝑞𝑖,𝑠,𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑠 ~𝑁 (𝑄𝑠,𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑠 (𝛽, 𝛿𝑜, 𝛿𝑢), (𝜎𝑠,𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑠 )
2
) 
where 𝑐𝑖𝑗 ∈ {15, 35} indicates the high or low transfer price. 
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The noise parameters 𝜎2 = (𝜎𝑛
2, 𝜎𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑗
2 , (𝜎𝑠,𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑟 )
2
, (𝜎𝑠,𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑠 )
2
) are specific to each treatment, while the 
behavioral parameters 𝜃 = (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿𝑜, 𝛿𝑢) are specified to be common across all treatments because they 
affect all players across these treatments. We estimate parameters 𝜃  and 𝜎2  through maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE), as described below. 
For shorthand, let 𝑡 denote the index for different treatments and 𝑁𝑡 denote the number of players 
in treatment t. Let 𝑖 =  1, . . , 𝑁𝑡 be the index for player in each treatment. Thus, the MLE is to find 𝜃 
and 𝜎2 so as to maximize the log-likelihood function for the observed order quantity, i.e., 
max
𝜃,𝜎2
ln(𝐿(𝜃, 𝜎2)) = −
1
2
ln(2𝜋) ∑ 𝑁𝑡
𝑡
+ ∑ ∑ (−
1
2
ln(𝜎𝑡
2) −
(𝑞𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑡(𝜃))
2
2𝜎𝑡
2 )
𝑁𝑡
𝑖=1𝑡
= −
1
2
ln(2𝜋) ∑ 𝑁𝑡
𝑡
−
1
2
∑ 𝑁𝑡 (ln(𝜎𝑡
2) +
𝜎𝑞𝑡
2 + (?̅?𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑡(𝜃))
2
𝜎𝑡
2 )
𝑡
 
where ?̅?𝑖𝑡 =
∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝑖=1
𝑁𝑡
, i.e., the average observed order for treatment t, and 𝜎𝑞𝑡
2 =
∑ (𝑞𝑖𝑡−?̅?𝑡)
2𝑁𝑡
𝑖=1
𝑁𝑡
, i.e., the 
variance of the observed order for treatment t. 
Taking the first derivative of the log-likelihood against 𝜎2 gives 
𝜕 ln 𝐿
𝜕𝜎𝑡
2 = −
𝑁𝑡
2
(
1
𝜎𝑡
2 −
𝜎𝑞𝑡
2 + (?̅?𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑡(𝜃))
2
𝜎𝑡
2 ) 
Thus, given 𝜃, we can solve the corresponding MLE estimator of 𝜎𝑡
2 as  
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜎𝑞𝑡
2 + (?̅?𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑡(𝜃))
2
 
Substituting 𝜎𝑡
2 back into the log-likelihood function, we have     
ln 𝐿(𝜃) = −
1
2
(ln(2𝜋) + 1) ∑ 𝑁𝑡
𝑡
−
1
2
∑ 𝑁𝑡 (ln (𝜎𝑞𝑡
2 + (?̅?𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑡(𝜃))
2
))
𝑡
 
Thus, we can obtain the MLE estimator of 𝜃  through max
θ
ln 𝐿(𝜃), which can be done using 
commercial optimization software such as Matlab.  
 
